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THE  MALLEABILITY  OF  COLLECTIVE  LITIGATION
Shay Lavie*
In Wal-Mart v. Dukes,1 Wal-Mart avoided class action because
employment decisions were made by local supervisors.  However, it was Wal-
Mart who chose to delegate discretion; by doing so, it made class litigation
less likely.  Wal-Mart’s choice of business administration, then, substantially
reduces its expected liability.  This is but one example of a broader, over-
looked phenomenon.  Mass defendants can control, before the occurrence of
damages, the scope of future collective litigation.  Collective litigation proce-
dures are malleable, sensitive to the defendant’s pre-damages choice of
actions.  This Article develops and substantiates this insight.
This Article elaborates on two manifestations of this phenomenon.
First, defendants can avoid class actions by “individualizing” the prospec-
tive class, injecting individual differences that preclude class treatment.  Sec-
ond, defendants can selectively contract with future victims, buying out the
stronger, leaving only weak victims with a claimable right, and reducing the
prospective class’s capacity to litigate.  Against this backdrop, this Article
proposes an array of mechanisms to strengthen collective litigation proce-
dures, including shifting the burden to defendants to justify the business
action that prevented collective litigation, and taxing defendants for making
the plaintiffs’ case weaker.
 2012 Shay Lavie.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* S.J.D Candidate, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to Yonatan Arbel,
Shmulik Becher, Ted Eisenberg, Louis Kaplow, Alon Klement, Alexandra Lahav, Adi
Osovsky, Ariel Porat, Bill Rubenstein, Roy Shapira, Steve Shavell, Adam Shinar,
Jennifer Shkabatur, Kathy Spier, and participants in the Law and Economics Seminar
at Harvard Law School, Annual Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop, and law
faculty workshops at Bar-Ilan University, Haifa University, Hebrew University, the
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, and Tel Aviv University for helpful discussions and
comments.  The ISEF Foundation’s support has made this research possible.  Finally,
while this Article expresses my personal views, I am particularly indebted to David
Rosenberg for the inspiration and for dozens of discussions on which this Article is
built.
1 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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INTRODUCTION
During the 2011 term the Supreme Court ruled on the largest
civil rights class action suit in U.S. history.2  In “one of the most expan-
2 Id.
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sive class actions ever,”3 hundreds of thousands of women claimed
that Wal-Mart—the world’s largest private employer4—discriminated
against them on pay and promotions in “literally millions of employ-
ment decisions.”5  However, the main issue before the Justices was not
substantive, but procedural.  Courts do not automatically authorize
class litigation; they first have to certify a lawsuit as a class action.  The
Wal-Mart certification debate centered on the following question:
whether these scores of women “have enough in common to join
together in a single lawsuit.”6  As Wal-Mart conferred pay and promo-
tion discretion on its local managers, the plaintiffs’ claims might be
too individualized to be pursued collectively.  While Wal-Mart argued
that plaintiffs “do not have enough in common to warrant class-action
treatment,” the plaintiffs, naturally, stressed the centralized, company-
wide policy behind pay and promotion decisions.7  These are the rules
of the game.
This Article moves beyond the Wal-Mart case, which was decided
against the plaintiffs,8 to examine the rules of the game more closely.
As Wal-Mart illustrates, the level of individual vis-a`-vis common ques-
tions is a crucial factor in the decision to authorize class litigation.
However, courts and scholars have overlooked that this essential fac-
tor—the commonality of the class—is often under the defendant’s
control.  Defendants can, so to speak, “individualize” the prospective
class.  Wal-Mart chose to delegate discretion to local supervisors; by
doing so, it made class litigation less likely.  When class treatment is
denied, plaintiffs have to pursue the far less effective individual litiga-
tion.  Wal-Mart’s choice of business administration, then, substantially
reduces its expected liability regardless of its actual fault.  This is but
one example of a broader, and largely undiscussed, phenomenon.  In
3 Id. at 2547.
4 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 629 (9th Cir. 2010).
5 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552.
6 Adam Liptak, Class Action at Wal-Mart has Justices in Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, March
30, 2011, at B1; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (mem.)
(granting petition for certiorari and adding the question “[w]hether the class certifi-
cation ordered . . . was consistent with Rule 23(a)”); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550
(“The crux of this case is commonality. . . .”).
7 Liptak, supra note 6, at B1. More precisely, the plaintiffs emphasized that Wal- R
Mart’s uniform policy facilitated discriminatory practices.  “[Wal-Mart’s] refusal to
cabin its managers’ authority amounts to disparate treatment. . . .” Wal-Mart, 131 S.
Ct. at 2548.
8 The Court asserted that “[b]ecause [plaintiffs] provide no convincing proof of
a companywide discriminatory . . . policy, we have concluded that they have not estab-
lished the existence of any common question.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556–57.
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virtue of their position, mass defendants can control, before any dam-
ages occur, the scope of prospective collective litigation.
The legal definition and structure of collective litigation proce-
dures, therefore, are not exogenous, given facts of life; rather, they
are manipulable and sensitive to the defendant’s pre-damages choice
of actions.  I refer to this phenomenon as the ex ante malleability of
collective litigation.  This Article develops and substantiates this
insight, and discusses its legal implications.  In doing so, it elaborates
on two ways in which mass defendants can frustrate, in advance, col-
lective litigation.  The first, a direct extension of the Wal-Mart exam-
ple, stems from doctrinal gaps that enable defendants to avoid class
actions; the second results from the capacity of prospective defend-
ants to selectively contract with future victims.
The perspective taken in this Article is in contrast with existing
views, which tend to take certification standards and, more broadly,
the very existence of collective litigation, as independent of the defen-
dant’s behavior.  More generally, this Article attempts to shift atten-
tion to what defendants can do to avoid litigation ex ante, before the
occurrence of damages.  Marc Galanter famously pointed to mass
defendants’ capacity to “come out ahead,” using their post-damages
litigation advantages.9  This Article discusses how mass defendants can
come out ahead ex ante as well, even before the occurrence of dam-
ages.  In fact, although the literature has focused on the post-damages
setting, taking pre-damages prophylactic measures to reduce the odds
of successful litigation may well be more effective, from defendants’
perspective, than resisting collective litigation after damages occur.10
The notion that firms conduct their businesses with an eye
toward collective litigation does not mean that the desire to block liti-
gation is the only motivation for their behavior.  Wal-Mart—although
in general notorious for its centralized decision making11—may well
9 Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 125 (1974).
10 As one defense attorney, advocating such a prophylactic approach, puts it,
“[o]nce out there, it is nearly impossible to put the ‘genie back in the bottle . . . .’”
ROB HERRINGTON, VERDICT FOR THE DEFENSE 237 (2011).
11 See, e.g., Pallavi Gogoi, How to Fix Wal-Mart? Ask Its Managers, BUS. WK., Aug. 21,
2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/aug2007/
db20070820_358861.htm.  Gogoi writes:
Point-of-sale data are analyzed and crunched at the Arkansas headquarters,
spitting out results for what’s selling and what’s not, what to restock and
what to pull from store shelves. Workers’ schedules are determined at the
home office . . . . There’s even a central 800 number that workers at the
3,500-plus stores must call when they need time off.
Id.
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have had independent commercial reasons, other than preventing
class actions, to decentralize pay and promotion decisions.  Neverthe-
less, collective litigation considerations presumably factor into mass
defendants’ calculus.  There is no reason to think that, anticipating
liability, defendants do not attempt to avoid costly collective litigation,
at least to some extent.  Defense lawyers, for example, advise their cli-
ents to change their course of action to reduce the risk of collective
litigation.12  Contractual waivers of class litigation, which are inserted
to standard-form contracts to reduce liability, proliferate after the
Court authorized such waivers.13  And after Wal-Mart the incentives
for firms to decentralize are likewise larger.14
This ex ante perspective to collective litigation procedures, the
focus of this Article, entails various legal implications.  The capacity of
defendants to manipulate, in advance, collective litigation procedures
is socially undesirable.  Collective litigation procedures (or the threat
thereof) are aimed at flattening the litigation inequalities between
mass defendants and individual plaintiffs, promoting deterrence and
fairness; in their absence defendants can often pay less than the harm
they inflicted on the group of plaintiffs.  Defendants who frustrate col-
lective litigation procedures create, in essence, litigatory damages—
the plaintiffs’ case is worth less, and sometimes much less, than it
should be.  In order to rectify this externality, this Article offers a
menu of responses, ranging from attention to concrete attempts to
avoid collective litigation, to a greater inclination to overcome individ-
ual differences among the would-be plaintiffs.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I presents the conventional
view regarding the role of collective litigation.  Where one defendant
faces individual plaintiffs, the defendant has inherent litigation advan-
tages—it enjoys better economies of scale and can settle selectively
12 For concrete examples see infra notes 74, 77, 88, 93, 95, 100, and 112.  Com- R
pare this to the capacity of injurers to target risky activity toward weaker communities,
which are less likely to oppose it, and whose damages are valued lower.  Richard L.
Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 809–10 (1990). See generally Nancy
Brooks & Rajiv Sethi, The Distribution of Pollution: Community Characteristics and Exposure
to Air Toxic, 32 J. ENV’T ECON. & MGMT. 233 (1997) (collecting empirical evidence on
the distribution of pollutants across race, class, and other characteristics).
13 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011);  infra note 95 R
and accompanying text.  These waivers seem to be an extreme, and more commonly
discussed, example of pre-damages attempts to reduce liability; accordingly, they have
also been harshly criticized. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
14 Cf. Steven Greenhouse, After the Wal-Mart Decision: Heavy Blow for Big Cases and
Lawyers who Bring Them, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at B1 (noting that, after Wal-Mart,
defendants should claim that they “delegate a lot of discretion to [their] branches”
(quoting Professor Heidi Li Feldman)).
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with plaintiffs.  These litigation advantages mean that the defendant
pays less than the harm it inflicted on the plaintiffs.  Collective litiga-
tion is a procedural tool that largely overcomes these difficulties.  This
is the common perception, viewing collective procedures as a vehicle
to effectively vindicate rights that are otherwise not worth pursuing.
Against this backdrop, this Article further shows that in many situ-
ations the defendant is in the position to control, before the occur-
rence of damages, the creation of successful collective litigation—i.e.,
the very procedures that are aimed at preventing the defendant from
exploiting its litigation advantages.  Part II discusses doctrine-based
malleability—how defendants can manipulate the commonality
requirements to avoid class certification.  Courts—Wal-Mart is but one
example—are hesitant to authorize class litigation where it raises too
many individual questions.  Defendants, however, can individualize
the class, injecting factual differences among the prospective plaintiffs
to avoid future certification.  Decentralizing discretion is one way to
do so.  Other examples include inducing modifications in written con-
tracts, creating artificial choice-of-law differences among future plain-
tiffs, and orally communicating with the would-be plaintiffs.  The
literature has given scant attention to the capacity of defendants to
shield themselves from class litigation by manipulating certification
standards.
The discussion on the malleability of the commonality require-
ments leads to a deeper form of malleability.  Part III shows how,
regardless of the law of class actions, mass tort defendants can affect
the structure and formation of collective litigation.  Briefly, mass
defendants can identify and cherry-pick strong victims, who are going
to be the moving force behind future litigation.  Once the defendant
locates the strong would-be plaintiffs, it is better off settling with them,
as these settlements make the remaining collective of plaintiffs
weaker—a “divide-and-conquer” strategy.  While the literature has
given attention to this problem in the context of selective settlements,
it has overlooked that the defendant can take a similar approach
before the occurrence of damages.  Conceptually, there is no differ-
ence between settling with trailblazing plaintiffs and buying out strong
would-be plaintiffs.  Both adversely affect the remaining victims and
reduce the defendant’s overall liability.  One example of pre-damages
selective contracts is buying out the residents in the vicinity of a nui-
sance, as these neighbors are those who would have the greatest
incentives to vigorously litigate against the defendant.  Excluding
them leaves the remaining victims worse off and reduces the defen-
dant’s overall liability.  In a similar way, the defendant can detect
strong would-be plaintiffs through standard-form contracts, encourag-
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ing them to sign liability waivers.  This Article, then, makes a novel
link between liability waivers and collective litigation.
The normative implications follow.  If defendants can avoid liabil-
ity through pre-damages manipulations, one should look for ways to
rectify this externality and improve existing collectivization proce-
dures.  A general, comprehensive solution is taxing defendants for the
harm they created, i.e., for making the plaintiffs’ case weaker.  As this
solution seems unlikely in practice, Part IV further delineates other
directions.  One set of responses is judicial case-by-case attention to ex
ante malleability.  In the context of class certification, courts can be
more liberal toward certification where defendants attempted to cir-
cumvent certification standards.  Courts can do so, for example, by
shifting the burden to the defendant to justify its “individualizing”
course of action.  In the context of selective buy-outs, judges can be
more suspicious toward liability waivers.  When this perspective is
taken, the results are contradictory to the existing law of disclaimers.
While currently judges are more inclined to honor liability waivers
between the defendant and sophisticated and informed consumers,
the ex ante malleability approach is more suspicious exactly toward
such agreements, as they are the most likely to harm remaining vic-
tims.  A second set of responses involves broader, class-wide solutions.
In the context of doctrine-based malleability, one direction may be a
shift to class-wide determinations of liability, which obviate defend-
ants’ desire to bypass certification by individualizing the class.  In the
context of ex ante buy-outs, possible class-wide reactions might be
prohibiting selective waivers, or assigning collective rights to a third
party.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL STORY AND THE ROLE
OF COLLECTIVE LITIGATION
Where one defendant harms multiple plaintiffs, the defendant
enjoys inherent litigation advantages over individual plaintiffs.  This
means that the value of the plaintiffs’ claims is lower than it should
be—victims are not fully compensated for their harms, and the defen-
dant is not obliged to pay the full costs for its wrongdoing.  Litigation
inequalities between plaintiffs and defendants are, therefore, a social
problem.  Procedures of aggregate litigation are considered to be a
tool to overcome these disparities.  This Part presents this conven-
tional story.  It surveys the inherent adjudicative advantages mass
defendants have, and how procedures of collective litigation can over-
come these inequalities.
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A. Mass Defendants’ Inherent Litigation Advantages
This section discusses the litigation advantages defendants have
when they face multiple plaintiffs, litigating them individually.  The
first is unequal economies of scale; the second is the ability to selec-
tively settle with plaintiffs.
1. Unequal Economies of Scale
One fundamental advantage defendants have stems from the fact
that compared to each individual plaintiff, mass injurers have more to
gain (and lose) from litigating each case.  The reason is that many
questions that have to be litigated in different cases are correlated;
hence, much of the work the defendant invests in litigating one case is
valuable for other cases.  Examples include investment in legal
research, scientific survey, and expert witnesses.  The defendant
enjoys “economies of scale by investing once-and-for-all in the com-
mon questions and spreading the cost of that investment across all
claims.”15  As the defendant has more at stake, it systematically invests
more in litigating each case.16  Hence, there is “a much greater
chance that the defendant . . . will prevail on the common ques-
tions.”17  It is true that under certain circumstances defendants may
prefer collectivization to litigating separately, in order to achieve
“global peace.”18  This may happen where individual plaintiffs can
extract more than the value of their claims.19  However, normally the
problem of unequal economies of scale creates a fundamental bias in
15 David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs
Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 397 (2000).  An embedded assumption is that invest-
ment in litigation typically has diminishing marginal returns—the more one invests in
litigation the greater the odds of winning, but the efficacy of this investment becomes
lower. Id. at 398.
16 Id. at 398.
17 Id. at 401.
18 For an illustration of this tension see Jonathan D. Rockoff, Merck Selects Lawyer
as Its New CEO, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2010, at B3: “[Merck’s new CEO is] the lawyer who
masterminded the . . . company’s strategy of defending the . . . drug Vioxx by fighting
every case separately instead of as a joint action. Controversial at the time, that strat-
egy is now seen as having minimized Merck’s losses.”
19 Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative Expected-Value Suits *2 (John
M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 656, Dec.
2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/
Bebchuk_656.pdf (explaining how plaintiffs in negative-expected-value suits can
extract a positive settlement); infra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. R
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favor of mass injurers who litigate individually.20  Indeed, mass
defendants usually struggle to avoid class litigation.
The problem of uneven incentives to litigate is more severe
under certain circumstances.  These situations include mass injuries
in which the correlation across cases is higher (more of the legal work
is common), and where the class is more fragmented (individuals
have smaller cases compared to the defendant).  In fact, in some cases
the result of this bias might be zero liability: individual harm that falls
short of a certain threshold, possibly in the range of thousands of dol-
lars, might well be too low to pursue individually.21  In other cases,
where individual claims are sufficiently large to pursue individually,
unequal economies of scale reduce the ultimate value of the plaintiffs’
claims, making the defendant’s liability lower.
2. Selective Settlements—“Cherry-Picking” Plaintiffs
Another way in which mass defendants can avail themselves of
their position is by striking selective, strategic settlements.  Plaintiffs
vary: some have better evidence, others suffer higher damages.  Those
with the better evidence and higher damages are more likely to initi-
ate a lawsuit.  Upon litigating, these “strong types”—whose cases have
a higher monetary value—are likely to invest more effort in pursuing
their claims.  Plaintiffs with weak evidence and low damages, “weak
types,” are less likely to sue; and if they do, they are likely to put less
effort into litigation.  Defendants can use this variance to settle selec-
tively—to use “divide-and-conquer” strategies.22  In particular, defend-
ants should find it worthwhile to settle first with the strongest
plaintiffs, i.e., those with the greatest incentives to litigate.
20 For a more comprehensive account of the divergent economies of scale in the
individual versus mass injurer setting see Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, Exploiting
Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer, 164 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 4
(2008); David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, On Structural Bias in the Litigation of
Common Question Claims *4–6, (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 11-28, Octo-
ber 14, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1950
196.
21 A plausible hourly billing rate of a law firm is around $250. See Kathryn E.
Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 259, 263–64 (A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).  Assume, for illustration, that a claim requires at
least twenty billing hours (i.e., $5,000 investment), and that the expected probability
to win given this investment is 33.3%.  Under these assumptions, only damages
beyond $15,000 are worth litigating.
22 Cf. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE ART OF WAR 180 (Book VI, 187) (Christopher
Lynch ed. and trans., 2003) (“A captain ought with every art to contrive to divide the
forces of his enemy . . . and, through this, [make him] weaker.”); Che & Spier, supra
note 20, at 19. R
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Because individual cases are correlated, each plaintiff that liti-
gates individually affects the remaining ones.23  Strong plaintiffs who
litigate individually confer a benefit on subsequent plaintiffs; the
stronger the plaintiff, the greater the value to the group.  This benefit
can be, for example, a favorable holding for the first plaintiff which
has a precedential value for fellow plaintiffs.24  In other examples the
value the first plaintiffs create is their attorneys’ work-product, which
can be used by later plaintiffs.25  In yet other cases, it is the mere pres-
ence of early claimants that enables others to “name and blame” the
defendant.26
Be it through precedential value, legal work-product, or mere
information regarding the tortfeasor’s identity, plaintiffs affect each
other.  Settlements, compared to trials, reduce the value that litigants
add to the remaining plaintiffs.  Hence, the defendant is better off
settling first with the strongest; these plaintiffs, in case trial occurs, are
likely to confer on other plaintiffs the largest benefits.  On the other
hand, when weak, losing plaintiffs produce negative common value,
the defendant might be better off taking them to trial.27  In short, as
23 See  Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 967 (1993) (“[T]he prospec-
tive value of many claims will rise or fall sharply with a large plaintiff award, a defense
verdict or even a signal discovery event or evidentiary decision in a single case that is
part of the mass of pending claims.”).
24 I use the term precedential value loosely to refer to any legal inference from
one case to following cases, typically, issue-preclusion arguments that subsequent
plaintiffs can assert against a defendant that lost a previous case.  For this nonmutual
offensive issue preclusion see, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and
the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 175–77 (2003).
25 See David Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Mass Torts Class Action, in REG-
ULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 244, 286–87, 95  (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (“Much of a
lawyer’s work product in litigation falls into the public domain and creates the incen-
tive for other attorneys holding similar claims to free ride.”).
26 Cf. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Hush Money, 30 RAND J.
ECON. 661, 664 (1999) (noting that some victims “attribute any illnesses they suffer to
other causes,” but other victims do “attribute at least some culpability to [the defen-
dant],” and that a lawsuit filed by the latter increases the odds that the former would
sue). See generally William L. F. Felstiner, et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming. . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981) (studying,
sociologically, the transformation of grievances, from injuries to legal disputes).
27 See Yeon-Koo Che & Jong Goo Yi, The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation, 9
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 399, 401 (1993) (concluding that, in the context of varying prece-
dential value, the defendant will attempt to settle with strong plaintiffs, and be more
aggressive toward weak plaintiffs, taking them to trial more often).
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Karl Llewellyn observed, defendants’ lawyers use the “strategy of
presenting cases in favorable series, settling the unfavorable cases.”28
Settling first with strong plaintiffs puts the remainder in a worse
position.  In some cases, the elimination of one strong plaintiff can
make litigation infeasible for the remaining, weak plaintiffs.29  In
other cases, litigation is still worth pursuing.  However, the absence of
the strongest makes the claims of the remaining plaintiffs less worthy,
as now it is harder for them to achieve successful legal results.  Hence,
excluding the stronger from the pool of plaintiffs reduces the
expected compensation that the remaining plaintiffs can get, and, as
before, makes the defendant’s liability smaller.  The more important
the strong plaintiffs are to the remaining ones, the defendant will find
this divide-and-conquer strategy more useful.30
In addition to lower liability, another outcome of strategic settle-
ments is transfer of wealth from weak to strong litigants.31  Typically,
strong plaintiffs can extract some of the gain the defendant
makes from settling with them first.32  In a sense, the defendant
28 Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1222, 1246 (1931).
29 For a concrete example, see infra notes 114–119 and accompanying text.  As R
noted above, supra note 21, damages below a certain threshold are not worth litigat- R
ing.  Collective litigation tends to be complex; hence, even where the remaining
plaintiffs can join forces, collective damages below several million dollars may be too
low to pursue.  As a suggested rule of thumb, “anything less than $5 million simply
isn’t worth the time and effort in filing a class action.” HERRINGTON, supra note 10, at R
176.
30 Strong plaintiffs are essential to the remaining ones when, for example, suc-
cessful litigation requires large investment, the claims of the weak plaintiffs are partic-
ularly low in value, or the remaining group is not allowed to sue collectively.
31 Another possible outcome might be more settlements, due to the defendant’s
inclination to avoid early trials. Cf. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum,
Informational Externalities in Settlements Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpabil-
ity, 33 RAND J. ECON. 587, 588 (2002); Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 26. But see R
Che & Yi, supra note 27, at 401 (predicting, under certain circumstances, more trials). R
32 To be clear, “strong” and “weak” refer to plaintiffs’ capacity to litigate.  They
may, but not necessarily, correlate with socio-economic status. Cf. Janusz A. Ordover, 
Products Liability in Markets with Heterogeneous Consumers, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 505, 517
(1979) (suggesting that low-income consumers suffer larger damages as the “propen-
sity to suffer damages correlates negatively with income.”); John Campbell et al., The
Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: An Introductory Essay with Four Case Studies *11,
(Harvard Kennedy School Working Paper, No. RWP10-40, September 1, 2010), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1649647 (discussing the
correlations between socio-economic status and the tendency to pay overly high prices
for financial products).
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and the strong plaintiffs are better off at the expense of weaker
claimants.33
Strategic settlements are an actual problem.  Defendants do seek
to settle as a means to resist potential mass torts and products liability
suits.34  Confidential settlements with first plaintiffs are a particularly
effective tool to avoid the spillover of valuable information to subse-
quent litigants and reduce the odds of future successful lawsuits.35
33 Under a simplifying assumption of symmetric information, and in case of equal
bargaining power, the defendant shares the gain with the strong plaintiff such that
they are both equally better off.  To the extent the defendant holds complete bargain-
ing power it extracts all the gain.  Divide-and-conquer strategies of this kind are not
effective where the plaintiffs have 100% bargaining power, i.e., the defendant is com-
pletely indifferent between settling and litigating.  These basic results can be modified
where the symmetric information assumption is dropped.  Daughety and Reinganum
provide a detailed and comprehensive account of information externalities between
litigants, and their results are illustrative of this discussion.  They investigate settings
in which a single defendant settles sequentially with two plaintiffs, the defendant has
private information the plaintiffs do not, and plaintiffs have 100% bargaining power.
The first plaintiff is “stronger” in the sense of knowing who the defendant is; the
second is “weaker,” because he is uncertain as to whom to sue.  By litigating, the first
plaintiff reveals the defendant, and hence she confers a benefit on the second plain-
tiff.  In a nutshell, Daughety and Reinganum find that the defendant would like to
prevent dissemination of information from early, strong to later, weak plaintiffs.  As
the defendant desires to settle with the first litigants, both the defendant and early
plaintiffs are better off at the expense of remaining plaintiffs.  Daughety & Rein-
ganum, supra note 31, at 596–601.  However, the results are more ambiguous where R
the defendant’s culpability is not correlated across plaintiffs.  In that case, first plain-
tiffs can sometimes extract a high premium from the defendant, offsetting the defen-
dant’s gain from later plaintiffs.  Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 26, at 674–71. R
As I discuss situations in which the defendant’s culpability is typically correlated (or
even similar) across plaintiffs, the general conclusion in the text holds: The defen-
dant is better off settling strong cases.
34 See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002).  “Parties who settle a
legal dispute . . . often do so . . . because they do not want the terms of the resolution
to be made public.  Defendants in particular are reluctant to disclose the terms of
settlement lest those terms encourage others to sue.” Id. Likewise, as arbitration is
less transparent, it is often preferable to mass defendants.  Judith Resnik, Comment,
Fairness in the Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and
Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 108, 111, 123–24, 132 (2011).
35 See, e.g., JAY TIDMARSH, MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS  33–45 (1998)
(discussing how Pfizer confidentially settled high-value claims and apparently reduced
its liability for defective heart valves); Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 31, at R
587–89; Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settle-
ments, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 869 (2007) (analyzing, among other things, the benefits
defendants gain from confidential settlements, and noting that “[c]ourts regularly
allow confidentiality provisions.”); Robert C. Nissen, Note, Open Court Records in Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation Under Texas Rule 76a, 72 TEX. L. REV. 931, 932–33 (1994) (“In
modern products liability cases, many defense attorneys routinely seek protective
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Likewise, when litigation is underway, defendants can attempt to dis-
tinguish between strong and weak cases, preferring to settle the for-
mer and litigate the latter.36  Similarly, strategic settlements can be
used to push toward a favorable precedent, hence making repeat play-
ers “come out ahead.”37
B. Defendants’ Litigation Advantages as a Social Problem
Mass defendants, then, can use their better position vis-a`-vis indi-
vidual plaintiffs.  They do so through unequal economies of scale and
selective settlements.  These litigation advantages reduce defendants’
expected liability.  The normative implications are clear.  First, victims
are not fully compensated for their damages.  This, however, might
not be a substantial problem to worry about.  Many perceive compen-
sating victims as a secondary goal of litigation.38  Individual harms may
be low in value, and, even where they are not, plaintiffs can often
insure themselves against the vicissitudes of life.  However, litigation
does more than fulfill individual goals—it serves a social benefit by
making the wrongdoers fully pay for the harm they inflicted.39
Hence, regardless of inadequate compensation, flawed litigation is a
social problem: defendants are not optimally deterred from taking a
harmful course of action.
While there might be an over-deterrence argument—i.e., litiga-
tion makes defendants pay more than they should and hence ineffec-
tive litigation is a blessing—this claim does not seem to be true across
orders to create a ‘wall of silence.’ . . . This has led to an explosion of sealed court
records cases.” (footnote omitted)).
36 See David Rosenberg, Comment, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Torts Cases:
Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 711 (1989) (“[D]efendants may
attempt to expedite weaker claims and delay the stronger ones . . . to construct a
string of . . . favorable verdicts.”).
37 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 9, at 101 (“[Repeat players would] ‘settle’ cases R
where they expected unfavorable rule outcomes.  Since they expect to litigate again,
[they] can select to adjudicate . . . cases which they regard as most likely to produce
favorable rules.”).  For some general empirical evidence of this practice see Catherine
Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 887–906 (1999) (focusing her analysis on the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1490–97 (2003) (examining the main theoretical models of deci-
sion-making in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals).
38 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency
Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 131–39
(2006); David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort
Class Action for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1874 (2002).
39 See William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2140–42 (2004).
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the board.  Whether collective litigation creates over-deterrence is
eventually an empirical question, which is presumably context-spe-
cific.  To the extent the over-deterrence problem exists, its scope has
contracted since the recent decisions heightening pleading stan-
dards.40  Furthermore, where abusive litigation is a problem, courts
should directly address it,41 for example, by a more aggressive use of
sanctions on frivolous suits.42
In principle, then, litigation inequalities are a social problem.
One should look for ways to restore equality between defendants and
plaintiffs.  Misalignment between the legal standard and the defen-
dant’s actual liability “should ring a warning bell that the law is proba-
bly inefficient and should be modified.”43  This is all the more correct
when litigation is the only effective means of deterring wrongdoing.44
C. The Solution: Collective Litigation
Collective litigation—in the form of class action, multidistrict liti-
gation (consolidating pretrial proceedings and discovery), or informal
aggregation by plaintiffs’ lawyers—overcomes most of these pitfalls.45
In the context of unequal economies of scale, collectivization
raises the stakes for the plaintiffs’ side, making it as eager to collec-
tively invest in the case as the defendant.  Put differently, collectiviza-
tion levels the litigation playing field.  Class actions are a particularly
40 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dis-
miss . . . the pleaded factual content [should] allow[ ] the court to draw the reasona-
ble inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”); Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (to survive dismissal a plaintiff must state
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
41 Cf. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2000) (“[T]he
risks of . . . blackmail settlements have been overstated, in that these problems can
effectively be handled by courts through appropriate . . . safeguards, without resorting
to the drastic remedy of eliminating or reducing the use of the damage class action.
We can shed the risks of abusive class settlements without scuttling class actions and
their considerable advantages.”).
42 Technically, Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enables courts
to levy sanctions on litigants and attorneys. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
43 Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 85 (2011).
44 For a brief discussion on the broader alternatives to litigation, namely, regula-
tion and the market, see infra notes 202–210.
45 As Howard Erichson convincingly argues, “leveling the field in light of the
asymmetric stakes” need not necessarily take the form of formal, compelled class
actions.  Sergio J. Campos & Howard M. Erichson, Debate, The Future of Mass Torts,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 231, 237 (2011), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/
debates/pdfs/MassTorts.pdf.
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effective collectivization tool.46  “By aggregating hundreds, thousands,
or even millions of claims, the class action can make small claims via-
ble and empower claimants . . . .”47
In the context of selective settlements, collective litigation makes
it harder, and less valuable, for defendants to cherry-pick strong plain-
tiffs to settle.  Class actions can empower plaintiffs and hence remedy
the problem of biased precedents, mitigating the “haves come out
ahead” concerns.48  Formal collectivization mechanisms can solve the
difficulties that are created when strong plaintiffs individually contract
with the defendant.49  Likewise, plaintiffs’ attorneys can informally
aggregate and share information,50 thereby mitigating attempts to
pick strong plaintiffs and/or conceal settlements.
46 Class actions are a more comprehensive collectivization mechanism than com-
peting, more voluntary options. See David Rosenberg, Response, Mandatory-Litigation
Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 857–66 (2002)
(arguing that voluntary aggregation results in greater transaction costs and free-riding
among plaintiffs and their lawyers); see also HERRINGTON, supra note 10, at 34 (“[M]ass
actions often are more difficult and more expensive to manage than class actions.”);
Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1079–81 (2012)
(explaining why informal aggregation is inferior); Resnik, supra note 34, at 145 R
(“While multiple forms of aggregation exist, class actions have proved specially attrac-
tive vehicles for bringing cases to courts.”); Genevieve G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-
of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1805–10 (2009)
(discussing how in the absence of class certification, even where alternative collectiv-
ization means such as multidistrict litigation are available, plaintiffs receive lower
compensation).
47 Charles Silver, “We’re Scared To Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1429 (2003); see also Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 617 (1997) (“A class action solves [the problem that small recoveries do not
provide incentives for individuals to bring actions] by aggregating the relatively paltry
potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”
(quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))).
48 Galanter, supra note 9, at 95, 150.
49 See Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 831–40 (suggesting mandatory collective litiga-
tion as a means, among other things, to avoid the problems created by opt-outs); see
also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness
and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 918–30 (1987) (propos-
ing mechanisms to avoid inefficient opt-outs); Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Pro-
cess, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1057–62
(2002) (delineating the boundaries of the right to opt out).
50 See Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil
Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 957 (2010) (explaining how information as to
secret settlements percolates throughout the legal community); Howard M. Erichson,
Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in
Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386–87 (2000) (noting that plaintiffs’ lawyers infor-
mally coordinate and share information).
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Collective litigation procedures in general, and class actions in
particular, then, serve a social goal as they enable plaintiffs to vindi-
cate their rights; in their absence, plaintiffs would recover much less,
if anything.  Consistent with this logic, a denial of class certification is
often described as “the ‘death knell’ of the litigation.”51  Likewise, it is
not surprising that defendants, by and large, fiercely resist the use of
collective litigation,52 even at the legislative level.53
Indeed, collective litigation mechanisms are widely considered to
be a procedural vehicle to overcome the problems created by the liti-
gation advantages that mass defendants enjoy.  “Class actions are a
conventional device for flattening [the adjudicative] inequities
[between defendants and plaintiffs].”54  Likewise, the American Law
Institute asserts that “[a]ggregation is a means by which courts may
promote justice under law more fully.”55  This conventional view
implies that collective litigation mechanisms—enabling victims to
overcome the advantages defendants have and vindicate their rights—
51 Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action
Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f),
41 WM. & MARY L. REV 1531, 1553 (2000).
52 Under certain circumstances, collectivization may be better for defendants. Cf.
supra notes 18, 40–42 and accompanying text. R
53 See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in Choice of Law After the Class Action
Fairness Act, 74 UMKC L. REV. 661, 661 (2006) (“[D]efense-side interests [managed]
to secure the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act . . . .”); David Rosenberg, The
Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos—Carnage, Cover-Up, and Litigation, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1693, 1706 (1986) (suggesting that those interested in reforming the tort system
represent broader interests); Silver, supra note 47, at 1429 (“One must therefore
expect repeat class action defendants . . . to oppose the use of litigation classes and to
enlist the help of tort reform groups and politicians when seeking to defeat
them . . . .”); York-Erwin, supra note 46, at 1804 n.53 (referring to several commenta-
tors who “assert that [the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005]’s corporate backers
hoped for exactly this result: Federal judges would . . . deny certification more
often”).
54 William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
433 (2001); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of
Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1927 (2006) (“[O]ne of the avowed
purposes of [1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] was to enable
the vindication through group litigation of claims under the substantive law that
could or would not be brought on an individual basis.”); Resnik, supra note 34, at 135
(“[F]or decades, the public and private sectors have endorsed forms of aggregation to
address the fairness problems of intra-litigant equality, the disparate resources of
opponents, and the equipage that a group can provide.”).  Of course, collective litiga-
tion has other goals, such as enhancing administrative efficiency. See, e.g., Ruben-
stein, supra, at 434–35.
55 AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.03 cmt. a.
(2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL204.txt unknown Seq: 17 12-FEB-13 15:49
2012] the  malleability  of  collective  litigation 713
are independent of the parties’ behavior. Indeed, these procedures
are often depicted as nothing more than tools that are plugged onto
“class members’ preexisting bundle of rights.”56  They are a vehicle, a
form of delegation of legislative power, and thus are bound by sub-
stantive rights.57
This view, however, overlooks the fact that these collective litiga-
tion procedures—which are supposed to suppress litigation dispari-
ties—are plagued by inequalities that are similar to the ones they are
aimed at eliminating.  This Article demonstrates that defendants are
often in the position to regulate, before the occurrence of damages,
the scope of the procedural vehicle itself.  The defendant, in essence,
sets the scene: the odds and form of successful aggregation are typi-
cally under its domain. The procedural tool, then, is not independent
of the parties’ choice of action.  This simple observation—that the
current design of collective litigation is malleable, vulnerable to myr-
iad forms of ex ante manipulations—has not been made in the litera-
ture.  It is the subject of the following Parts.  Part II discusses how
defendants can affect, ex ante, the odds of certifying class litigation.  I
refer to this phenomenon as doctrine-based malleability.  Part III
shows how defendants can use the variance among future plaintiffs to
frustrate, before the occurrence of damages, the formation of success-
ful collective litigation.
II. DOCTRINE-BASED MALLEABILITY—“INDIVIDUALIZING” THE CLASS
A. The Crucial Class Certification Standards
1. Overview
As mentioned above, class actions are considered an effective tool
to vindicate victims’ rights.  While class litigation overcomes the
problems that are associated with the inherent litigation advantages
mass defendants have, it has its own flaws.  Most notably, class action is
a formal collectivization mechanism that binds absent plaintiffs to an
outcome of a legal process in which they did not participate.  This is a
salient exception to a “principle of general application in Anglo-
56 Nagareda, supra note 24, at 174. R
57 Id. at 191–98.  Class litigation “has no roving authority to alter unilaterally class
members’ preexisting bundle of rights . . . .” Id. at 181.  This view relies, in part, on
the Rules Enabling Act, which delegates the power to promulgate procedural rules to
the Supreme Court, but only to the extent such rules do not “abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b); see also AM. LAW INST., supra
note 55, § 1.03 cmt. a. (“[C]ourts are not . . . empowered to select substantive poli- R
cies . . . [but they] are empowered to create and revise adjudicatory procedures [to
further legislative policies] . . . .”).
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American jurisprudence.”58  Class actions, in short, harm the plain-
tiffs’ due process rights.  In order to respect victims’ individual rights,
legal systems define a minimum threshold to initiate class action.
These are the certification requirements—the gatekeeper to the
world of class litigation.  Certification, then, embodies the balance
between the need to achieve the advantages of collective litigation and
the desire to respect individual rights.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure delineates this
balance.  Among the basic prerequisites to certification, courts have to
ensure that the class of victims is too large to voluntarily join into a
collective;59 that “there are questions of law or fact common to the
class;”60 and that the class is adequately represented.61  These and
additional requirements that Rule 23 sets are crucial.  The stakes are
high. In the absence of class certification, individual litigation is often
impractical; and, as a matter of fact, once a class is certified the parties
are likely to settle for sizeable amounts.  No wonder, then, that Rule
23’s standards are debated: defendants typically argue that plaintiffs
fail to meet these requirements, and plaintiffs argue that certification
is appropriate.
While Rule 23’s requirements are a sensible apparatus to deter-
mine the borderline between class and individual litigation, these
requirements are vulnerable to manipulation by the defendant.  The
task of this section is to substantiate this argument, focusing on the
requirement that the questions raised by the plaintiffs are not too
individual.
2. Individual versus Common Questions
Many of the inquiries that judges ought to take before certifica-
tion center on whether there are “too many” individual questions.
The aggregation of the plaintiffs’ cases can raise common questions,
which are similarly solved for all the members of the class (e.g.,
whether the harmful product was negligently designed); it can also
raise individual questions that are resolved differently for each mem-
58 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general applica-
tion in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in per-
sonam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not
been made a party by service of process.”).
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
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ber of the class (e.g., whether, and to what extent, each plaintiff negli-
gently contributed to the damages).62
Courts, in principle, disfavor certifying a class in which there are
too few common questions relative to individual ones—i.e., the class is
not sufficiently “cohesive.”  The tension between individual and com-
mon questions appears in several contexts.  First, Rule 23(a) demands,
as a basic prerequisite to certification, that “there are questions of law
or fact common to the class” and that the representative’s claims are
typical of the common ones.63  Second, the most prevalent clash
between individual and common inquiries is the predominance
requirement.  In order to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, the
court should find “that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.”64  Finally, even where common questions predominate
over individual ones, courts deny certification of class actions that are
not “manageable” due to a high proportion of individual questions.65
The crucial role that individual differences play in class certifica-
tion makes some sense.  The more individual questions there are, the
greater the effort the court will have to invest in adjudicating the class;
and vice versa: more common questions mean a more easily resolved
class action.66  Similarly, more individual questions indicate that the
court should be more cautious toward plaintiffs’ procedural rights.
“The presence of important noncommon issues . . . raises doubts
about the administrative efficiency of combining claims into a class
62 As the Supreme Court has recently clarified: “[Common questions] must
be . . . capable of class-wide resolution—which means that [their] determination . . .
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one
stroke.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
63 See the commonality and typicality prerequisites, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2),
(a)(3), respectively.  These requirements overlap, to some extent. See Gen. Tel. Co.
of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982); 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:13, at 317–24 (4th ed. 2002).
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  For the partial similarity between the predominance
requirement and Rule 23(a) prerequisites see RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF
CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 74–75 (2009).
65 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D); NAGAREDA, supra note  64, at 155–56; cf. Klay v.
Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1269 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he more common issues
predominate over individual issues, the more desirable a class action lawsuit will be as
a vehicle for adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims.”).
66 See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998)
(‘“When common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they can be
resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication, there is clear justifica-
tion for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an individual basis.’”
(quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHER R. MILLER, & MARY ANN KANE, 7A FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1778 (2d ed. 1986))).
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action and about the infringement of plaintiffs’ individual autonomy
and due process rights.”67  In addition, for the reasons discussed
above, more common questions aggravate the litigation advantages
that mass defendants have.  More common questions indicate a
higher correlation across cases; collectivization is presumably more
necessary the more correlated the cases.68  On the other hand, one
can question all these arguments.  The existence of relatively more
individual questions does not make collectivization futile.  More com-
monality among claims makes class litigation more efficient, but col-
lectivization of cases with at least some common questions is
presumably more efficient than the baseline of litigating each case
individually.69  Likewise, as long as there are some common questions,
mass defendants can have a substantial litigation advantage.  The rele-
vant question for policy makers to ask is the extent to which defend-
ants are likely to be in a better position when litigating individually.
While the degree of common questions is one factor that affects the
importance of class litigation in equalizing the litigation playing field,
it is by no means the only one.  Collectivization is particularly impor-
tant, for example, where the alternative is likely to be no litigation and
zero deterrence (and compensation), as is common in low-value
claims, regardless of the common/individual questions ratio.  A
greater portion of individual questions in the mix of common issues,
then, does not eliminate the necessity of collectivization.
Certification standards reflect a balance between conflicting
interests.  The predominance requirement and the way courts have
interpreted Rule 23 embody an essential aspect of this balance—class
actions should not consist of “too many” individual questions vis-a`-vis
common questions. While there are pro and con arguments, this is a
defensible position.  However, under the conventional view this bal-
ance assumes for each class litigation a given, exogenous mixture of
individual and common questions.70  It is here that the predominance
requirement becomes more tenuous.  As I will describe below, the
individual/common questions ratio is not predetermined; rather, in
many cases it is the defendant’s ex ante choice of action that dictates
67 Note, Locating Investment Asymmetries and Optimal Deterrence in the Mass Tort Class
Action, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2665, 2676 (2004).
68 See supra text accompanying notes 20–21. R
69 Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011) (“We quite
agree that for purposes of [the commonality requirement] [e]ven a single [common
question] will do.” (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
70 Cf. Resnik, supra note 34, at 164 (“The task is to decide which persons or enti-
ties can be understood as sufficiently similar to proceed as a juridical set . . . .”).
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the level of individual questions—defendants can easily “individual-
ize” the prospective class.  From this perspective, it is far less obvious
to decide whether to certify a class based on a criterion controlled by
one of the parties.
B. Inducing Factual Differences—“Individualizing” the Class
Current doctrine, I argue, enables defendants to influence in
advance the level of individual questions, and, as a result, whether
courts would certify class litigation.  Doctrine allows defendants to
“individualize” the class.  The way to do so for defendants is to choose,
before the occurrence of damages, a course of action that induces
factual differences.  In many cases, as case law demonstrates, these fac-
tual differences frustrate class certification.  The following paragraphs
provide paradigmatic examples in which class certification is sensitive
to the course of action the defendant had chosen.
1. Individualizing Written Contracts
A supplier can offer its customers a uniform contract.  Alterna-
tively, it can tweak the standard contract, injecting individual differ-
ences.  Some courts find these differences destructive of class
certification.  Against this backdrop, one court denied certification of
contract claims in a case where physicians alleged that the defend-
ants—health maintenance organizations (HMOs)—breached con-
tracts, systematically underpaying the doctors for medical services:
The algorithms . . . [used by the defendants’ computer programs]
appear to be . . . varied and complicated . . . . Instead of applying one
specific universal rule to cheat all doctors (e.g., automatically deducting
$100 from everyone’s claim), the . . . programs are instead alleged to
apply a variety of more individually tailored rules . . . . Even if the plain-
tiffs were to prove that computer systems “sometimes” . . .
[underpays the plaintiffs] this fact would do nothing to further any
of the plaintiffs’ individual breach of contract claims.71
Importantly, it seems that the individualized class in this example
is in a similar need of collectivization as the hypothetical, non-individ-
ualized one, in which defendants would apply “one specific universal
rule to cheat all doctors.”  The cases in the individualized class are a
bit less correlated, but litigating them individually is likely to result in
substantially lower, if not zero, overall liability.  Hence, the policy justi-
71 Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
While reversing certification based on breach of contract claims, the court did affirm
certification on RICO claims. See id. at 1276.
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fications for class litigation in the individualized scenario are (almost)
equally important.
Many other examples of individualized contracts exist.72  While
individualizing the class may be a demanding task in certain circum-
stances, in many cases—as the HMOs example suggests—it simply
requires programming slightly different contracts.73  As one defense
attorney advises:
Remember, class actions thrive on similarity. . . . If you can make
changes that introduce significant variability, you can limit your risk
of class actions.  So look for ways to modify the material terms of the
contract . . . . Change the wording.  Move paragraphs around.
There is almost never just one way to say something. . . .  [M]ix it up
a little.  If you do this correctly, you can limit class action
liability . . . .74
72 In another case the appellate court decertified franchisees’ contractual action
against a franchisor because the standard agreements were subject to individual modi-
fications.  Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 340 (4th Cir.
1998) (“[P]laintiffs simply cannot advance a single collective breach of contract
action on the basis of multiple different contracts.  As the district court itself recog-
nized, [contracts] ‘may vary from year to year and from franchisee to franchisee.’”).
In yet another action by franchisees the court denied certification due to disparity in
contractual provisions.  Thompson v. T.F.I. Cos., Inc., 64 F.R.D. 140, 146–47 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (“[T]hreshold factual distinctions as minute as they may be may have a vital
bearing on the applicability of a common legal provision and may very well inject an
‘uncommonness’ that fragments the class.” (quoting Gaines v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Corp., 1972 CCH Tr.Cas. ¶ 73,860, at 91,604 (N.D. Ill. 1972))); cf. Schachner v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 77 F.3d 889 (6th Cir. 1996) (refusing to certify a con-
tractual claim where a common term was ambiguous and hence presumably subject to
individual negotiations).  “[T]he court reasoned that, since the clause at issue was
ambiguous, it would have to consider extrinsic evidence of negotiations between [the
defendant] and its . . . [customers] to construe the meaning of the clause.” Id. at 895;
see also NAGAREDA, supra note 64, at 186. R
73 In another illustrative case, for example, the court denied certification due to
an alleged computer bug, which created random misrepresentations of the product
on the defendant’s website. See Sevidal v. Target Corp., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66 (Ct. App.
2010).
74 HERRINGTON, supra note 10, at 113–14.  Likewise, two defense attorneys advise R
their clients in the following words:
It is critically important to do everything possible to segregate each case as
an individual matter.  The key is to avoid class certification, because it is
much easier to divide and conquer than to deal with a large group en masse.
Therefore, cookie-cutter . . . agreements are not advisable . . . they should be
modified so that each contract is different.
Brian S. Arbetter & Andrew J. Boling, Emerging Trends in Wage and Hour Cases and
Defense, in UNDERSTANDING FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT VIOLATIONS 125–26 (2010).
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Defendants, then, can often introduce individual differences in a
relatively easy manner.  The certifiability of class actions that are justi-
fied on policy grounds is, at least in certain cases, completely under
the defendant’s control.
2. Creating Choice of Law Differences
A related opportunity to avoid, ex ante, class certification, is
inserting choice of law differences.  Divergence in applicable law
means, in essence, differences among the plaintiffs, as there are more
questions that are not completely common to all the members of the
class.75  Courts are indeed reluctant to certify a class where different
state laws apply.  “The existence of significantly differing state laws
currently poses a virtually insuperable obstacle to certification of mul-
tistate, diversity class actions. . . . [C]ourts regard the potential man-
agement difficulties and diseconomies of this ‘daunting enterprise’
sufficient to tip the balance against class certification.”76  However,
uniformity in applicable law is not an objective, pre-existing standard.
Rather, it can be set, to some extent, by the defendant.  Consider the
following:
Firms can create, pre-damages, differences in applicable law.  One
way to do so is using different types of standard-form contracts, each
of which dictates a different law governing the transaction.  Another
way is stipulating that the applicable law is the law of the state where
the consumer resides.  The result is similar: after damages occur,
courts will be reluctant to authorize a unified action due to the mul-
tiplicity of applicable law.77
75 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., supra note 55, § 2.05 cmt. a. R
76 Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A Solution to the Choice of Law Problem of
Differing State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374, 374–75
(2011) (quoting In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2008),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom.; UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 137
(2d Cir. 2010)); see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“In a multi-state class action, variations in state law may swamp any common issues
and defeat predominance.”); Nagareda, supra note 53, at 671 (arguing that there is a
“general hostility of courts toward nationwide product liability classes on choice-of-law
grounds”); York-Erwin, supra note 46, at 1794 (“Choice of law has proven to be one of
the most consistent obstacles to . . . class certification”).  For notable examples of
cases in which courts denied certification, see also id., at 1802–03, 1814–15, 1824;
Rory Ryan, Comment, Uncertifiable?: The Current Status of Nationwide State-Law Class
Actions, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 467, 470 n.5 (2002) (providing a case list of federal courts
denying certification of nationwide state-law class actions on choice of law grounds).
77 See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071 (Cal. 2001)
(decertifying a class due to choice-of-law provisions in nationwide mortgage agree-
ments, which choose the governing law to be the law of the state where the property is
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As before, these induced variations allow defendants to reduce
the odds of prospective certification, at least in certain
circumstances.78
3. Varying Oral Communication
Mass service providers often have a choice as to the method to
convey the message to their customers.  Oral representation is an indi-
vidualized method of communication, which, compared with written
representation, is more likely to escape prospective class certification.
In one paradigmatic case, for instance, where patients who received
an implant that was not approved by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) brought a class action against the physician, the trial court
denied certification of  informed consent claims:
Given the distinctly factual nature of the informed consent ques-
tion, however, the court hesitates to find commonality on this
issue . . . .  The emotional state and injury of each proposed plain-
tiff, not to mention possible variations in the conversations with [the Doc-
tor], renders this area unsuitable for certification.79
As this example shows, oral, individual communication has the
same “individualizing” capacity as the contractual modifications in the
previous examples.  Both can prevent inference of sufficient common-
ality and hence block class certification.80  In this example the individ-
located); see also Medina v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18916, at *1,
*15–17 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2005) (No.02-02133-CIV) (in an individual action, the sup-
plier alleged that a standard-form provision allows it to elect, for each customer, that
damages be determined by the law of the consumer’s domicile); Linda Silberman,
The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2016 (2008)
(“[C]hoice of law clauses in consumer contracts [can be used strategically] as a means
to block class litigation. . . . [A] choice of law clause that might ostensibly seem more
favorable to the consumer—e.g., the law of the state where the consumer resides—
presents the difficulty of the application of multiple laws in class actions.”); cf. HER-
RINGTON, supra note 10, at 118–19 (“[I]ncluding a choice-of-law clause in consumer R
contracts . . . [is] a gift for plaintiffs’ lawyers, as [it helps] remove a major hurdle to
class certification.”).
78 As federal courts are considered more stringent regarding multi-state class cer-
tification, the potential use of ex ante choice of law manipulations has become larger
since the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) of 2005, which expanded federal jurisdic-
tion to entertain multi-state class actions. Cf. York-Erwin, supra note 46, at 1804 n.53
(noting that “CAFA’s corporate backers” intended to make certification of multi-state
class actions harder).
79 Hum v. Dericks, 162 F.R.D. 628, 640 (D. Haw. 1995) (emphasis added).
80 For the similarity between written individual modifications and oral represen-
tations see Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 882
(5th Cir. 1973) (“[C]ourts usually hold that an action based substantially . . . on oral
rather than written misrepresentations cannot be maintained as a class action.  Simi-
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ualizing force of the oral consultations with the doctor was strong
enough to overcome the uniform consent form, which did not dis-
close that the implant was not FDA approved.81
Similar examples, illustrating the individualizing role of oral com-
munications, regularly appear where plaintiffs claim breach of orally-
made (or orally-negotiated) contractual obligations82 and in fraud
cases.83  As before, both the “individualized” and the “non-individual-
larly, if the writings contain material variations, emanate from several sources, or do
not actually reach the [plaintiffs], they are no more valid a basis for a class action than
dissimilar oral representations.” (citations omitted)).
81 Hum, 162 F.R.D. at 640.
82 Particularly, oral communications can individualize an otherwise uniform con-
tract.  In one case, a motion to certify class litigation against insurers was denied due
to different oral representations, notwithstanding evidence of standard practices and
allegations that the oral representations were nothing more than reiterations of uni-
form promotional materials. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tribco Const. Co., 185 F.R.D.
533, 539 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“[T]his court is not convinced that the alleged oral repre-
sentations were the same to all the insureds in the putative class.”); see also Frahm v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 137 F.3d 955, 957 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[For
some of the plaintiffs’] claims everything depends on what was said or sent to each
agent personally, and different benefits advisers said or wrote different things to dif-
ferent agents. Individual rather than class litigation is the best way to resolve person-
specific contentions . . . .”); Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584,
597 (7th Cir. 1993) (declining certification because some contractual obligations
were made orally to the group of plaintiffs: “[I]it is not known whether the communi-
cations were uniformly made . . . . Presumably each of the other three groups of
[plaintiffs] had its own . . . seminars and pamphlets.”); In re Indus. Diamonds Anti-
trust Litig., 167 F.R.D. 374, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[Price-fixing claims should not be
certified where the defendant] sold thousands of distinct products for which [prices
vary] . . . based on . . . negotiations with each purchaser.”).
83 One court, for example, denied certification of customers’ fraud allegations
against a telephone company, asserting that the plaintiffs could not prove that the
defendant “made the same core of misrepresentations to all, or most, members of the
putative class.”  Stephenson v. Bell Atl. Corp., 177 F.R.D. 279, 293 (D.N.J. 1997).
Another court refused to certify a class action based on fraud allegations against an
insurer.  See  Parkhill v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 188 F.R.D. 332, 342 (D. Minn. 1999)
(“[P]olicies were sold in hundreds of thousands of individual meetings between inde-
pendent agents and prospective clients. . . . [T]he information disclosed . . . to poten-
tial policyholders would depend on the client’s needs and circumstances. . . .  [The
transactions involved] non-uniform oral representations at different times and places
with different agents.”).  In another insurance fraud case, the court denied certifica-
tion in the following words: “Where, as here, the information contained in the illus-
trations was shared with consumers, if at all, in the context of varying oral
representations, presumption of reliance is inappropriate.” In re Jackson Nat’l Life
Ins. Co. Premium Litig., 183 F.R.D. 217, 222 (W.D. Mich. 1998).  In yet another fraud
case, the court denied certification due to “variations in facts [that] defeat the pre-
dominance factor . . . .  Because there were several seminars in Houston and several in
Memphis, problems ar[ose] when considering oral representations made at each of
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL204.txt unknown Seq: 26 12-FEB-13 15:49
722 notre dame law review [vol. 88:2
ized” versions of the cases seem to justify class treatment—in the
absence of class action, individual litigation is likely to extract far less
compensation, if any, from the defendant.
4. Heterogeneous Plaintiffs and Products
The more diverse and heterogeneous the class, the less likely is
certification.  Similar to the previous examples, the range of damages
and the plaintiffs’ identity—both predict certification—are often
under the defendant’s control.  Hence, as before, the class is ex ante
malleable.  Consider the following decision to deny certification of
fraud allegations against gaming machine manufacturers, due to the
inherent differences within the pool of customers:
Gamblers do not share a common universe of knowledge and
expectations . . . .  Some players may be unconcerned with the odds
of winning, instead engaging in casual gambling as entertainment
or a social activity.  Others may have played with absolutely no
knowledge or information regarding the odds of winning . . . .  Still
others, in the spirit of taking a calculated risk, may have played fully
aware of how the machines operate.84
Targeting a more diverse audience is therefore valuable for the
prospective defendant, as it reduces the odds of class action if and
when damages materialize.85  Likewise, creating variability in damages
the separate seminars.”  Marascalco v. Int’l Computerized Orthokeratology Soc’y,
Inc., 181 F.R.D. 331, 340 (N.D. Miss. 1998); see also Martin v. Dahlberg, Inc., 156
F.R.D. 207, 215 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (a consumer fraud case in which individual salesper-
sons made different representations, yielding “diversity of messages . . . and [hence
potentially] differing reliance on varied information” which thwart class adjudica-
tion); Williams v. Balcor Pension Investors, 150 F.R.D. 109, 114 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(”[The proposed class representative was inadequate due to his reliance] on oral rep-
resentations by his investment advisor [which made him] subject to a unique defense
. . . .inapplicable to the remainder of the class.”).  For additional examples and discus-
sion see CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 63, § 3:15, at 335–67; Samuel Issacharoff, The R
Vexing Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class Actions, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1641 (2000);
Shawn S. Ledingham, Jr., Note, Aggregate Reliance and Overcharges: Removing Hurdles to
Class Certification for Victims of Mass Fraud, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 307 (2010) (“[In mass
fraud cases] a personal reliance requirement makes class certification nearly impossi-
ble due to the need for individual inquiries.”).
84 Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 665–66 (9th Cir. 2004).
85 Other examples of too-heterogeneous classes exist. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 226 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[I]ndividuals may have relied on
defendants’ misrepresentation to varying degrees in deciding to purchase [light ciga-
rettes]; some may have relied completely, some in part, and some not at all.  Thus,
establishing . . . that defendants’ misrepresentation caused an increase in [demand]
would require individualized proof.”); In re Methionine Antitrust Litig., 204 F.R.D.
161, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (denying a motion to certify price-fixing claims as class
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can block certification—as one court reasoned its decision to deny
certification of antitrust claims, “the prices for some customers are
going up while the prices of other customers are not .”86 Similar logic
makes the defendant better off when its activity potentially harms
plaintiffs in different times and locations—the more dispersed the
activity is, courts are generally more reluctant to certify.87  A related
reasoning applies to products heterogeneity.  “[W]here the allegedly
defective ‘product’ is actually a line of products that are similar, yet
have distinguishable formulations, compositions, or configurations,
courts refuse to certify on the grounds of factual variation.”88
members, indirect purchasers, differ) (“The [c]ourt cannot ignore the evidence that
shows that some of the class members . . . may not have been injured by the antitrust
conspiracy because the overcharge was not passed along or because the class member
itself passed along the full amount of the overcharge to its customers.”); Kaczmarek v.
Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 186 F.R.D. 307, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Each computer user
may have modified his or her computer hardware and software in ways that affect
sound/video/modem capabilities and performance.  Some of the named plaintiffs
have reconfigured their hardware, overclocked their system, failed to upgrade and/or
installed new operating systems and software drivers and applications.”).
86 In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 314 n.12 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting AM. BAR. ASSOC. SECTION OF ANTITRUST Law, ECONOMETRICS 210 (2005)).
87 The most famous example is probably Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 609 (1997) (rejecting certification of claims against asbestos products manu-
facturers, noting that “class members . . . were exposed to different asbestos-contain-
ing products, in different ways, over different periods, and for different amounts of
time”); see also Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 342 (4th
Cir. 1998) (certifying a class consisting of all the defendant’s franchisees since 1986
creates difficulties; with respect to limitation claims, for instance, “[the appropriate
analysis is] individualized inquiry into what each franchisee knew about [the defen-
dant’s] operation . . . and when he knew it”).
88 Joel S. Feldman, Class Certification Issues for Non-Federal Question Class Actions—
Defense Perspective, in JOEL S. FELDMAN & KEITH M. FLEISCHMAN, PRACT. LAW INST., NON-
FEDERAL QUESTION CLASS ACTIONS: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE STRATEGIES 243 (2001);
see also HERRINGTON, supra note 10, at 177 (“[T]he more segmentation, the better . . . R
segmentation refers to creating material differences [for example] between . . . ver-
sions of product . . . .”).  For relevant case law see, for example, Lyon v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 194 F.R.D. 206, 221 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“[T]he . . . engine is not a single product,
but rather is made in several ratings (different models).  The variations of the . . .
engines necessitate a more individualized factual inquiry, a factor weighing against
certification of this putative class.”); Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., 191 F.R.D. 441, 456
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (denying certification of claims that vehicle paint was defective, due
to, among other things, “variations in paint applications and configurations”); In re
Ford Motor Co. Vehicle Paint Litig., 182 F.R.D. 214, 220 (E.D. La. 1998) (“[Certifica-
tion should be denied because t]his case does not involve a single failure event or a
simple, fungible product.  Rather, Ford’s challenged course of conduct spanned at
least seven years and involved different models of vehicles, made of different materi-
als, painted a variety of colors at different plants, using different paint formulae.  Fur-
ther, Ford’s paint processes changed over time.”); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II
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As in the previous examples, targeting diverse plaintiffs and dis-
seminating heterogeneous products can individualize the class, mak-
ing it uncertifiable; denying certification, in turn, allows the
defendant to pay less than the harm it allegedly inflicted on the
victims.
5. Decentralizing Action
Class action defendants are often hierarchical organizations.
Their structures matter.  Courts are less likely to certify class litigation
where more discretion resides at the defendant’s lower ranks, as indi-
vidual differences are then more salient.  Hence, by decentralizing
decision making, an organization can avoid class litigation.  Take the
following example:
Facing potential future liability, a retail giant chooses to delegate
authority to local managers.  To avoid class action based on discrim-
inatory policies, for instance, local supervisors hold discretion
regarding hiring and promotion.
The recently decided Wal-Mart case presents an essentially similar
question.89  As Wal-Mart’s counsel concluded at the oral argument,
“because the plaintiffs’ claims in this case hinge on the delegation of
discretion to individual managers throughout the country, they can-
not meet the cohesion requirements.”90  Employment discrimination
is but one example of molding class certification ex ante through
decentralization.91  In other areas, decentralized discretion leads to
similar individualization of the class.92  “[A] company could signifi-
Prod. Liab. Litig., 177 F.R.D. 360, 372 (E.D. La. 1997) (refusing to accept common
rollover defect argument, inter alia, as the car was “sold over seven years in varying
configurations”); Harding v. Tambrands, Inc., 165 F.R.D. 623, 630 (D. Kan. 1996)
(“[Certification of this class against tampon manufacturers denied because d]uring
the [relevant] time frame . . . the defendants each marketed a number of different
styles of tampons.  [They] made various changes in fiber composition and absor-
bency . .  . .”).
89 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
90 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, id. (2011) (No. 10-277), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-277.pdf.
91 Cf. Greenhouse, supra note 14 at B1 (noting that the Wal-Mart decision will R
make it tougher for plaintiffs to bring “nationwide class actions against a large com-
pany with many branches” because the plaintiffs “would have to offer strong evidence
of a nationwide practice or policy”).
92 See, e.g., Parkhill v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 188 F.R.D. 332, 342 (D. Minn.
1999) (refusing to certify fraud allegations against insurer because “defendant did not
require a uniform sales presentation” and sales agents made “non-uniform oral repre-
sentations”); Martin v. Dahlberg, Inc., 156 F.R.D. 207, 215 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (denying
class adjudication as individual salespersons made different representations).
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cantly limit its risk of class actions by introducing more autonomy in
how sales and customer service personnel deal with consumers . . . .”93
Again, policy justifications point in similar directions in both the
decentralized and the centralized cases—in both, without class litiga-
tion the defendant’s overall liability would fall short of the damages it
inflicted on the plaintiffs.
* * *
This list of mechanisms, from injecting contractual differences to
decentralizing discretion, is not exhaustive.94  Some of the mecha-
nisms may overlap with others.  Nonetheless, these mechanisms do
illustrate the very same point—ex ante choices of business organization
can make prospective certification harder and hence reduce liability.
As the aforementioned quotations from defense lawyers suggest, there
is no reason to think that firms that face the risk of multi-million dol-
lar class actions are oblivious to these considerations and to the
opportunity to reduce prospective liability.  While this Part focuses on
the manipulability of the commonality requirements, the very same
considerations motivate suppliers to draft the more commonly dis-
cussed mandatory arbitration clauses, which prohibit the use of class
actions.95  Indeed, in light of the straightforward effect of these
93 HERRINGTON, supra note 10, at 145; see also id. at 144–45 (“[The] proposal to R
free your company’s customer service personnel from scripts and policies injects the
potential for significant variability into each customer’s experience.  Countless class
actions have been filed that are based on [uniform] guidelines followed by sales or
customer service personnel.”); Arbetter and & Boling, supra note 74, at 126 (“Broad R
policies . . . are also less desirable than specific directives.”).
94 Another possible way to avoid certification is to transact with plaintiffs who
would not be easily located ex post. See, e.g., In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapples Anti-
trust Litig., 2008 WL 5661873, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008) (No. 1:04-md-1628
(RMB)) (“[Certification denied] no matter how easy it is to establish damages on a
class level, if it is extremely difficult or almost impossible to distribute these sums to
their rightful recipients, the class is unmanageable.” (quoting City of Philadelphia v.
Am. Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72 (D.N.J. 1971))).  For a criticism of this so-called
“ascertainability” requirement, see Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial
Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 307 (2010).
95 As mandatory arbitration clauses mandate individual resolution, those who
sign them have a meager threat of suing.  As one defense attorney put it:
[Mass defendants should require consumers] in the potential class to pursue
individual claims in a separate arbitration.  Since many (and perhaps most)
of the putative class members may never do that . . . strict enforcement of an
arbitration clause should enable the [defendant] to dramatically reduce its
aggregate exposure.
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396 (2005) (quoting Edward Wood Dunham, The
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mandatory arbitration class action waivers, the Court’s decision that
authorizes their use has been attacked by academics, legislators, and
judges;96 and it may lose some of its sweeping application as a result of
this critical reaction.  The lesson of this Article, however, is that a
similar pre-litigation, collectivization-avoidance logic can proliferate
in numerous domains without any visible response.
It is true that aggregation is sometimes in the interest of mass
defendants.97  It is also true that there are often independent business
reasons to introduce individual differences.98  Likewise, firms that do
inject individual differences to reduce liability may simultaneously
harm the efficient administration of their own businesses.99  Neverthe-
less, these are qualifications to the general argument.  The main mes-
sage of this Part is that the level of individual differences, from
defendants’ perspective, is a choice variable—they are able to set it in
order to achieve optimal outcomes.  The strategic value of individual
Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 141, 141 (1997)).  For other
examples see id. at 396–98. See also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts,
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 895 (2008) (concluding that the “use of mandatory
arbitration clauses may be based more on strategic advantage than on a belief that
corporations are better serving their customers”).
The Supreme Court recently upheld the validity of such clauses in a 5–4 decision
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  Technically, the Court
rested its decision on grounds external to Rule 23—the Federal Arbitration Act was
held to preempt state prohibitions on mandatory individual arbitration provisions.
Id. at 1747. Concepcion, then, paves the way for a more pervasive use of class action
waivers. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Will Federal Consumer Bureau Ride to the Rescue of Class
Actions?, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (April 29, 2011, 6:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2011/04/29/will-federal-consumer-bureau-ride-to-the-rescue-of-class-actions/?blog_id
=14&post_id=39935 (paraphrasing a partner saying that upon the holding of Concep-
cion “he is advising clients to start crafting class-action waivers”).
96 For academic criticism, see, for example, Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After
Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 623 (2012). See also Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012).  For a survey of legislative
attempts to limit the reach of Concepcion, see Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class
Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 791–94 (2012) (“Congress is
increasingly responding to calls for protection against mandatory arbitration in cer-
tain sectors.”).  For lower courts’ attempts to distinguish Concepcion see, for example,
Post-Concepcion, Plaintiffs Chalk Up Few Victories, Look to Government for Relief, Class
Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) (13 Class) 525 (May 11, 2012).
97 See, e.g., supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. R
98 See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the context of Wal- R
Mart’s decentralized discretion).
99 In the context of Wal-Mart, for example, decentralization blocked class litiga-
tion, but it also clashes with Wal-Mart’s tradition of highly centralized decision mak-
ing and closely monitored stores. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
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differences, along with other business considerations, factors into
mass defendants’ decision making.100  Firms can choose, in each case,
whether to “individualize” the prospective class or not.  While some-
times firms are better off not changing their ordinary course of action,
presumably there are many circumstances in which it is valuable for
mass defendants to individualize the prospective class.101  The unilat-
eral capacity of mass defendants to manipulate collective litigation
procedures, if they find it worthwhile, resurrects the one-sidedness
that these procedures are aimed at rectifying.
The success of the foregoing mechanisms in individualizing the
class stems from the doctrinal reluctance to certify classes that raise
too many individual questions.  Doctrine, as always, is far from being
neat and well-settled.  The rules are context-specific.  While some
courts are more skeptical of class litigation, others are willing to certify
a class notwithstanding minor individual differences.  However, even
when courts do authorize a class, the exact boundary between “suffi-
ciently cohesive” and “too individual” is hotly contested.102  Plaintiffs
argue that there is uniformity, defendants stress individual differ-
ences, and the court ultimately draws the “commonality line.”103
While this might be a reasonable judicial approach to apply law to
facts, it is a less convincing one when the legal standard for adjudicat-
100 The following advice from a defense lawyer illustrates the competing consider-
ations: “Many companies, with good reason, attempt to standardize their contracts
across products and business units.  This standardization creates a risk—the risk of a
class action.” HERRINGTON, supra note 10, at 112.  “[I]ntroducing Strategic Variability R
to reduce the risk of consumer class-action lawsuits while at the same time maintain-
ing consistency . . . are not mutually exclusive.” Id. at 84.
101 While this Article focuses on the capacity of individualizing mechanisms to
reduce defendants’ liability and deterrence, additional efficiency loss stems from the
effect of these tools on firms’ behavior: where firms choose to inject variability in
order to avoid certification, they conduct their business in a more individualized man-
ner than they would have done otherwise. Cf. Chris William Sanchirico, Detection
Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1337 (2006) (discussing the implications of law-
breakers’ attempts to avoid getting caught, and noting that, “[f]rom a societal per-
spective, detection avoidance is deadweight loss”).
102 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), provides a good example.
As noted above, the case centers on the issue of commonality, given Wal-Mart’s decen-
tralized decision making.  Prior to the Supreme Court decision in favor of Wal-Mart,
there were four different decisions certifying the class, the last one on a 6–5 vote en
banc.  All five decisions extensively discuss the commonality requirement. For the
district court opinion, see Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal.
2004); for the two circuit court opinions, see Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214
(9th Cir. 2007), and Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007); and for the
en banc decision, see Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010).
103 For the use of the term “commonality line” in this context, see Wal-Mart, 131 S.
Ct. at 2562.
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ing a class—sufficiently few individual questions—is controlled by one
party.  As the foregoing examples demonstrate, in many areas defend-
ants have the capacity to manipulate, ex ante, the level of individual
questions.  From this perspective, the struggle to find the line between
overly individualized and sufficiently uniform seems much less useful,
given that the policy reasons behind class litigation apply to individu-
alized and non-individualized classes in an almost similar force.  Why
should one commercial activity be exempt from effective enforcement
while a similar activity is liable?  Why should defendants avoid liability
based on their choice of organizational structure?
The following Part demonstrates another manifestation of the
same phenomenon—the malleability of collective litigation
procedures.
III. SELECTIVE PRE-DAMAGES CONTRACTS
While the discussion thus far has centered on the capacity of
defendants to take advantage of class action doctrine to avoid class
certification, this Part takes this logic further and discusses a broader
form of malleability—defendants’ avoiding collective litigation
through selective ex ante contracts.
While class action is the most effective collectivization mecha-
nism, it is not the only one.104  This section argues that the very forma-
tion of collective litigation is, in general, vulnerable to ex ante
manipulations.  In contrast to the previous Part, individualizing the
prospective class, the phenomenon described in this Part is not based
on doctrinal gaps; rather, it has deeper roots, which stem from the
freedom of potential victims to contract with the would-be defendant.
In fact, this is the pre-damages manifestation of strategic settlements,
in which defendants can selectively buy out plaintiffs to reduce their
overall liability.  This phenomenon is explored below.
A. Ex Ante Divide-and-Conquer
As previously discussed, mass injurers can strike strategic selective
settlements, after damages materialize, to eliminate strong claims.  I
argue that similar strategies can be used by mass injurers before the
occurrence of damages.  Conceptually, the two settings are similar.
Basically, whatever defendants can do after damages materialize, they
can also do when there is only a prospect of harm.  While the strate-
gies do not diverge conceptually, their practical implementation is dif-
ferent.  In the post-damages setting it is strategic settlements; in the
104 See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. R
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pre-damages setting it is waivers of prospective liability.  To demon-
strate the blurry line between the two, consider the following illustra-
tive example:
A golf course is negligently operated and golf balls hit adjacent
premises.  There are two identifiable classes of victims: the first
includes those who border the golf course, and the second consists
of farther landowners.  The second class suffers fewer damages, and
the longer distance makes it harder to prove the golf course’s liabil-
ity.  The golf course buys out the first class’s rights to sue—either
before, after, or during damages, through liability waivers or settle-
ment agreements.  The second class’s members are less likely to ini-
tiate a lawsuit, and if they do, their odds of winning are lower.  If the
second class’s damages are sufficiently low, it poses no credible
threat of litigation.105
As this example illustrates, there is no substantive difference
between post-damages strategic settlements and pre-damages selective
waivers.  Of course, the two settings are not identical.  The post-dam-
ages victims are known—typically, they are the ones that initiate the
legal proceedings; pre-damages, the defendant has to reach out to the
would-be plaintiffs.  Where settlements are agreed upon in the shadow
of uncertainty regarding the results at trial, ex ante selective waivers
implicate another layer of uncertainty—whether damages would
occur or not.
These differences do not mean that pre-damages selective waivers
are necessarily less effective, from the defendant’s perspective, than
post-damages strategic settlements.  In fact, it is plausible to believe
that, in some contexts, ex ante agreements are a better way to buy out
strong plaintiffs.  In the post-damages environment lawyers spring up,
creating information networks that counter attempts to strategically
and confidentially settle.106  In contrast, before damages occur there
are typically no agents who share information and negotiate on behalf
of the group of victims.  A related advantage of pre-damages liability
waivers, from defendants’ perspective, stems from their subtlety.  Stra-
tegic settlements are a more blunt measure to buy out strong claim-
ants, and they may streamline further political, judicial, and public
reaction against the defendant. Ex ante exclusion, i.e., liability waiv-
ers, might be safer and more effective in this respect.107  Another dif-
105 This example is inspired by Sierra Screw Products v. Azusa Greens, Inc., 151 Cal.
Rptr. 799 (Ct. App. 1979).  In that case, the defendant, who created a similar nui-
sance, alleged that its contract with the neighboring plaintiff includes liability waivers.
106 See, e.g., Campos & Erichson, supra note 45; Erichson, supra note 50. R
107 Cf. David Gilo & Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconscionability Through a Market Lens, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 133, 151–52 (2010) (stating that suppliers may prefer “selectively
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ference that can make liability waivers more effective than settlements
is the tendency of post-damages victims to be driven by non-economic
motives, such as feelings of vengeance and a desire to restore
equity.108  These non-economic motivations inhibit post-damages stra-
tegic settlements.  As one commentator observes, “irrational litigation
decisions help counteract the resulting [pro-defendant] bias and
should be applauded.”109  Because these non-monetary incentives do
not typically appear before the occurrence of damages, they can make
pre-damages waivers easier to implement, from the defendant’s per-
spective.110  Finally, defendants may be better than plaintiffs at assess-
ing the risk of an injury, making liability waivers more valuable for
defendants.111
In short, by the time the defendant is facing a multi-million dollar
lawsuit, counteraction might be too late or too costly.112  Selective buy-
outs, then, can be a highly effective tool to thwart future collective
litigation.  This result conflicts with a prominent position in the litera-
ture, mostly articulated by Howard Erichson.113  According to this
view, class actions are not as important an aggregation tool as they are
oppressive terms” as they attract less judicial and public attention than the traditional,
directly oppressive terms).
108 See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settle-
ment: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 142–47 (1994) (providing evi-
dence for the proposition that plaintiffs are “equity-seek[ers],” interested in validating
their claims in addition to maximizing monetary value).
109 Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32 (2000).
110 Moreover, pre-damages waivers “may undermine consumers’ motivation to
insist upon their rights and seek compensation.”  Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Infor-
mation in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723,
748 & n.111 (2008) (referring to the empirical evidence in Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew
J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the
Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83
(1997)).
111 Particularly, consumers might underestimate some risks. See, e.g., Russell
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1231–33 (2003).  Likewise, to the extent that prospective plaintiffs
are more risk-averse than prospective defendants, the additional uncertainty that is
associated with selective waivers makes them cheaper for the defendants.
112 As one defense attorney—who advocates such a “preventive” approach—
argues:
[B]usiness leaders become very attentive . . . when they are facing a ten or
hundred-million-dollar lawsuit.  But by then it is too late.  We don’t wait
until our engines seize up to change the oil in our cars . . . .  Why then would
we not take the same preventive attitude to our [clients]?  . . .  Once out
there, it is nearly impossible to put the “genie back in the bottle . . . .”
HERRINGTON, supra note 10, at 11, 237. R
113 See supra notes 45, 50. R
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considered to be; plaintiffs’ lawyers often fulfill a similar aggregatory
role, informally coordinating and sharing information across plain-
tiffs.  However, this reliance on lawyers overlooks the ex ante perspec-
tive.  Defendants have the capacity to exclude, pre-damages, some
victims, hence avoiding the benefits created by post-damages lawyers.
The following paragraphs further illustrate this phenomenon.
B. Examples
There are numerous ways in which defendants can implement
selective contracts that affect the formation of prospective collective
litigation.  The gist is identifying the strongest would-be plaintiffs, who
have the greatest influence on the prospective class.  This section pro-
vides several paradigmatic examples.
1. Nuisances
Nuisances, and more generally environmental damages, suffer
from severe enforcement problems.  Damages are typically dispersed
and most victims have no credible threat to sue.114  In this state of
affairs, a single, strong would-be plaintiff is highly attractive for the
defendant.  Buying-out this strong plaintiff makes the defendant (and
the strong plaintiff) better off at the expense of weaker plaintiffs/vic-
tims.  And as explained above, there are good reasons for the prospec-
tive defendant to prefer a pre-damages waiver to waiting for the strong
plaintiff to initiate a lawsuit, settling thereafter.
As the golf course example demonstrates, the strong would-be
plaintiffs—whom the defendant wants to exclude the most—can often
be the neighbors of the harmful activity.  Those who live near the nui-
sance have greater incentives to eliminate it; those who are far away
are not likely to successfully array their legal weapons.  The story of
the Campo Band of Mission Indian reservation is illustrative.
In the early 1990s, San Diego looked for an out-of-town place to
establish a new landfill.  The reservation surroundings—a “scrub-cov-
ered ridge” amidst a “desolate patch of windswept high desert”115—
seemed like an excellent location.  Apart from the Indian tribe there
114 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 624 (2d ed.
2000) (“Because large-number situations foster free-riding, it hardly would be surpris-
ing if none of the many nuisance victims had filed a lawsuit during the prescriptive
period.”); Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255,
279–80 (1993) (“[I]t may be that harm is dispersed, as is often true with pollution-
caused losses, so that individual victims might not find bringing suit worthwhile.”).
115 Robert Reinhold, Indians and Neighbors Are at Odds Over Waste Dump on Reserva-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1990, at A1.
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were very few inhabitants.  The major would-be victim of the landfill,
the tribe, agreed to have the nuisance in its terrain in exchange for an
appropriate compensation.  This, however, ran counter to the other
inhabitants’ interests.  “For the 250 inhabitants of the reservation . . .
the landfill means big money. . . .  To their ranch and farm neighbors,
though, it is a potential source of contamination . . . .”116  Lacking the
strongest potential plaintiff—the Indian tribe that was bought out by
the landfill—the remaining would-be victims had much less ammuni-
tion to resist the nuisance.  As they lived further away from the land-
fill, their prospective harm was likely to be smaller and their damages
harder to prove; in essence, these prospective victims had a very weak
credible threat of a lawsuit.  Indeed, their attempts to stop the landfill
failed.  As local activists attest, “[i]n spite of all [our] efforts and suc-
cesses, we could not stop the [project’s approval;] . . . [we] did not
have the financial resources to file suit.  The County did file suit . . . .
Their one young attorney . . . was outgunned by multiple well-heeled
big shots, including an ex-US Attorney, representing the landfill
proponents.”117
While the landfill project ended due to other reasons,118 this
story illustrates ex ante divide-and-conquer contracts.  The major pro-
spective plaintiffs are bought out by the defendant.  In the absence of
the strongest would-be victims, the remaining—even when they are
able to collectivize themselves—find it harder to vindicate their rights.
In the Campo landfill case, it seems that the contract between the
tribe and the landfill was an indispensable reason for the residents’
inability to stop the creation of the nuisance.  Moreover, this incident
is not unique; rather, it is typical of other nuisances in which one (or
several) known neighbor is the primary victim, while others—the
majority of the victims—suffer only minor harms.119
116 Id.
117 The History of Campo Landfill, BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS, http://www.back
countryagainstdumps.org/history_of_landfill.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
118 Mainly, the “contract approved in the early 1990s faltered after the garbage
company . . . went bankrupt.”  Onell R. Soto, Campo Tribe Giving Up on Landfill Project,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 3, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.signonsandiego.
com/news/2010/jun/03/tribe-junking-dump-project.
119 For another pre-damages nuisance/buy-out example of this kind, see Abel,
supra note 12, at 810 n.82. Cf., Michelle Nijhuis, How the Five-Gallon Plastic Bucket R
Came to the Aid of Grassroots Environmentalists, GRIST, July 23, 2003, available at http://
www.grist.org/article/the19 (highlighting the organized attempt to urge immediate
neighbors to curb large-scale nuisances).
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2. Products Liability: Disclaimers and Standard-Form Contracts
Products liability is another paradigmatic case to implement
selective contracts.  One defendant harms multiple consumers, who
diverge on several characteristics.  As the parties have pre-existing con-
tractual relations—through standard-form contracts between the
defendant and the consumers—the defendant can easily locate and
exclude plaintiffs.  Indeed, many common provisions in standard-
form contracts can serve to exclude stronger plaintiffs.  Technically,
these provisions can be selective, optional disclaimers, which
encourage the strong consumers to get a discount in exchange for
waiving their rights to sue.  As before, the key factor is identifying
“strong” consumers/plaintiffs, whom the defendant desires to
exclude.
a. Damages-Based Exclusion
One example of provisions that distinguish between strong and
weak plaintiffs hinges on the different damages that consumers are
likely to sustain.  Those who are likely to suffer larger damages would
probably have the highest incentives to initiate a future lawsuit.
Hence, they are the stronger prospective plaintiffs. Take the following
case:
A dry cleaning chain sets a provision according to which it is respon-
sible for damages only up to a certain low threshold.  Simultane-
ously, high-value customers are encouraged to “opt-out” by buying,
for a fair fee, insurance for damages greater than this low threshold.
The firm, in essence, identifies and creates two classes of customers,
those with higher and lower damages.  The former pays a fair fee
for insurance, perhaps even extracting a premium, and is better off
though it has no claimable right of action.  The latter group has
small claims, which are not worth litigating.  Overall liability is
reduced and the dry cleaning chain is better off.
In the actual case that motivates this example the court decided
to invalidate the contract, though not because of the fear of diluted
post-damages enforcement.120  There are other paradigmatic situa-
tions in which the defendant can easily distinguish between high- and
low-damages consumers.  The defendant can, for example, identify
120 The same example is given, for other reasons, in David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The
Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction
Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 1015
& n.74 (2006).  The case is CA 1/79 Dry Cleaning Factories Keshet Ltd. v. Attorney
General 34(3) PD 365 [1980] (Isr.).  At the time of the Keshet decision, consumers
could not bring class actions.
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frequent users of the product—whose damages are likely to be
larger—and offer them a discount in exchange for waiving their rights
to sue.  Such provisions leave only non-frequent users with a claimable
right; these consumers are less likely to litigate successfully.121
While excluding high-damages consumers cuts the class’s incen-
tives to litigate, it might be justified on commercial grounds.  Where
there are two groups of consumers, with higher and lower expected
damages, the supplier, who may lack prior knowledge regarding the
consumers’ type, can offer a menu of prices and warranties in an
effort to sort the two groups.  In particular, it is common to say that
the supplier should offer expensive, full insurance to attract the high-
damages consumers (who have a greater demand for insurance).
Under this description, low-damages types are left with less-than-opti-
mal insurance (as they are not willing to pay that much).  Hence, the
supplier can sort the two groups.122  On the other hand, the strategy
of enticing high damages consumers is not a trivial one.  Firms often
cap damages in order to, among other reasons, “get rid of high-cost
consumers.”123
Either way, the bottom line is similar: design of standard-form
contracts often separates strong from weak consumers, leaving only
the weak to litigate.  This design makes post-damages adjudication
more difficult—collective litigation is malleable to ex ante
manipulations.
b. Evidence-Based Exclusion
High-damages consumers are not the only prospective plaintiffs
whose incentives to litigate are stronger.  Those who are likely to pos-
sess better evidence would presumably have easier cases, and in this
sense they are stronger as well; hence the supplier/defendant is better
off excluding them from the pool of potential plaintiffs.  Consider the
following hypothetical example:
Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) are designed for both urban, paved-
road and recreational, off-road driving.  Damages that materialize
during recreational driving are harder to prove, as they often result
121 Cf. Gilo & Porat, supra note 120, at 989–93 (providing examples of standard-
form provisions which aim at identifying repeat consumers).
122 See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 56 (2005).
For a discussion and several anecdotal examples of similar price/quality discrimina-
tion practices, such as options to terminate in franchise agreements and airlines’ tar-
iffs, see Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design,
VA. L. REV. *24–28 (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2010083, *19–20.
123 Gilo & Porat, supra note 107, at 173 n.95. R
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from factors other than the manufacturer’s fault.  Limited-use war-
ranty covers only the safer, urban use.  Post-damages, the only plain-
tiffs with claimable rights are the off-road drivers, who have weaker
cases (evidence-wise).
This example can be generalized to other limited-use warranties
that cover only safer activities.124  Similar to previous examples,
weaker plaintiffs (in terms of evidence) find it harder to litigate and
win post-damages.  Who would want to take a case in which the plain-
tiffs knowingly engaged in high-risk activity?  The formation of future
successful collective litigation is therefore under the defendant’s con-
trol.  The result is, again, lower overall liability and transfer of wealth
from weaker to stronger consumers.  Commercial reasons may
account for the differential treatment that safe-users receive.  But
again, whatever the reasons for these waivers are, the outcome is lower
odds of successful litigation against the defendant, and hence reduced
liability and deterrence.
Other common standard-form provisions fit this pattern of
excluding strong consumers based on the likely strength of their evi-
dence.  Sellers, for example, often provide full insurance but limit the
warranty period.125  This move excludes from the pool of potential
plaintiffs buyers whose damages accrue within a given time, leaving
those who face late damages to litigate on their own.  The latter group
has a weaker claim, as it is typically harder to prove damages the more
time passed.  Hence, leaving only late-victims to litigate post-damages
reduces suppliers’ liability.  The same logic applies to restricting cov-
erage only to immediate buyers—third party victims are likely to have
weaker cases.  While limiting coverage in these examples can again be
driven by various commercial reasons, the consequences are similar—
by choosing a certain course of behavior pre-damages, the defendant
dilutes post-damages enforcement.
c. Personal-Based Exclusion
Good evidence and sizeable damages make stronger plaintiffs/
consumers, who are more likely to wage a successful lawsuit.  Consum-
ers’ strength, in this sense, can manifest itself in other ways.  Certain
124 Cf. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (2010) (stating that the implied warranty of
merchantability covers “fit for the ordinary purposes”).
125 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical
Analysis of Software License Agreement, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677, 697–99 (2007)
(discussing findings on the practical prevalence of statute-of-limitations restrictions);
see also Steven M. Haas, Contracting Around Fraud Under Delaware Law, 10 DEL. L. REV.
49, 56 (2008) (“[C]ontracts often contain . . . specific time periods for submitting
indemnification claims, which act as contractual statutes of limitation . . . .”).
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consumers are simply more likely to effectively stand up for their
rights.  Common provisions in standard-form contracts can serve to
exclude these stronger consumers:
A widget supplier distributes coupons—drafted in English—which
offer insurance (or discount) for waiving liability.  Immigrants and
other non-English speakers are not likely to discern these coupons.
Hence, when damages materialize, this low-means group is left to
litigate on its own.  Expected liability is lower.126
In the same spirit, standard-form contracts often hide exemptions
from harsh, draconian terms, such that only careful consumers are
likely to find them.127  These more-aware consumers, who are capable
of finding hidden exemptions, are also the most likely to initiate a
successful lawsuit in the future.128  Likewise, firms that sell over the
internet regularly ask buyers to check either “home-user” or “busi-
ness” before being allowed to proceed, offering different contracts to
each group.129  Business buyers are presumably the more sophisti-
cated consumers, whom the supplier/defendant desires to exclude
from litigation the most.  More generally, this description fits the the-
ories that attribute to a small group of more aware customers—the so-
called “shoppers”—the power to drive prices down in a competitive
market.130  These shoppers, the market’s agenda-setters, are the very
plaintiffs the defendants would like to “bribe” for waiving their claims.
Their absence makes the remaining consumers/plaintiffs worse off.
While, as before, there might be commercial reasons to sort out
business buyers, the justifications for hiding exemptions such that
only sophisticated consumers can find them are less obvious.  Regard-
less of the motive the results are again the same—the suppliers’ pre-
damages behavior reduces incentives to litigate post-damages, yielding
lower liability.
126 This hypothetical is inspired by the examples provided in Gilo & Porat, supra
note 120, at 988–89. R
127 See Gilo & Porat, supra note 107, at 147–49 (providing several actual examples
of draconian terms with concomitant hidden exemptions).
128 Those who look for the hidden terms, as Gilo & Porat describe, are either
consumers who value their time less; large, repeat buyers; or sophisticated customers.
Id. at 151.  These are the very same aware-consumers who are more likely to trigger a
lawsuit.
129 See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 125, at 710 & n.51. R
130 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 649 (1979).
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d. The Market Does Not Correct
Selective exculpatory provisions, then, are a prevalent phenome-
non, especially in certain areas.131  They result in the following: weak
consumers/plaintiffs, with lower incentives to adjudicate, find it
harder to litigate ex post; stronger consumers/plaintiffs gain at the
expense of weaker ones; and the defendant’s overall liability falls short
of the damages it inflicted on the group of consumers.
As defendants can implement selective waivers through standard-
form contracts, one may ask why the remaining, weak consumers can-
not demand a better contract for putting them in a worse position.
According to this logic, low-damages, weak-evidence, and non-sophis-
ticated consumers should understand, upon reading the standard-
form contract, that high damages, strong-evidence, and sophisticated
consumers are excluded; and this understanding should push the
demand of the weak consumers down.  A similar question can be
asked with regard to other ex ante manipulations of standard-form
contracts—such as stipulating choice-of-law provisions—that put con-
sumers in a worse position.132  There are two general arguments
against the proposition that consumers reduce their demand in these
circumstances.
First, one may suspect that consumers are not aware of all the
risks and properties of a given product.  Whether due to consistent
cognitive limitations133 or high transaction costs of deciphering long
and complex standard-form contracts,134 consumers are usually not
fully informed regarding products’ risks.135  This is a fortiori true with
regard to the more subtle, second-order repercussions of provisions
131 Many cases of this kind would not end up in courts, as plaintiffs with valid
claims are too weak to litigate.  Interestingly, the dry cleaning standard-form contract
was not challenged by customers, but by the Israeli attorney general in quasi-adminis-
trative proceedings. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. R
132 See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. R
133 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 111, at 1227; Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Eco- R
nomics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 757–58 (2008); Campbell et al.,
supra note 32, at *9–11. R
134 See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 32, at *8 (“[S]earch costs give retailers a R
degree of market power, allowing them to charge prices above marginal cost.”).  The
more complex the subject-matter is, the more severe is the problem.
135 Better and simpler provision of information, induced by regulation and con-
sumer organizations, can often mitigate, but not eliminate, the problem.  See, e.g.,
Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2010) (“We
are skeptical . . . about the efficacy of disclosure mandates . . . to avoid . . . welfare-
reducing . . . contracts . . . .”); Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes,
Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON.
505, 530 (2006) (“[D]isclosure laws . . . have [been] met with only mixed success.”).
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that reduce the odds of future successful litigation.136  In fact, even
when consumers can easily be informed regarding price and qual-
ity,137 it is much harder to draw their attention to the more compli-
cated consequences of exculpatory provisions.138  Take, for example,
the revolutionary effect of information technologies.  Scholars tend to
praise the internet for allowing consumers an immediate and cheap
way to compare products’ prices and quality.  As Richard Epstein con-
vincingly argues, “the use of web-based information has increased
transparency so greatly that it is hard to recall the tedium of obtaining
information for routine business transactions before the web.”139
While free websites do provide valuable reviews with regard to salient
attributes such as price and quality,140 it is harder to compare less sali-
ent characteristics.141  A quick surf on the web reveals that the
136 For example, note the distinction between “search qualities” (e.g., readily
observable price), “experience qualities” (e.g., product’s quality, learned by experi-
ence), and “credence qualities” (attributes that are not discoverable even through a
long use of the product). See Becher, supra note 110, at 740 & n.68 (referring to R
Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the
Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 596–97 (1990)); see also Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note
135, at 25–26 (discussing more subtle exploitation of consumers, unilateral modifica- R
tions of form contracts, which “cannot be mitigated by third-party intermediaries such
as Consumer Reports”); Korobkin, supra note 111, at 1234 (distinguishing between “sali- R
ent” and “non-salient” contract terms, and stating that, in contrast to salient terms,
“non-salient attributes are subject to inefficiencies driven by the strategic behavior of
sellers attempting to increase their profits . . . .”).
137 For the general focus on regulating more salient terms, particularly price, see
Mark R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form Contract: Competition and Contract
Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 366–67 (2010), and Oren Bar-Gill & Oliver
Board, Product Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure 5–8 (NYU Univ. Sch.
of Law, NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 10-50, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701653.
138 Compare the so-called “financial literacy”: while price can be easily grasped,
evidence shows that many people simply do not have the means to cheaply compre-
hend more subtle attributes, such as financial repercussions. See Campbell et al.,
supra note 32, at *9–10.  In the current context it is plausible to think that many R
people suffer from “legal illiteracy,” leading them to disregard the consequences of
exculpatory provisions.
139 Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 803, 814–15 (2008) (footnote omitted).  On the other hand, the internet may
also enable suppliers to better identify strong consumers, making ex ante divide-and-
conquer easier. Cf. Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard
Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 303, 348–49 (2008).
140 For such websites, see, for example, Epstein, supra note 139, at 809 n.36, 814 R
n.58.
141 More subtle price and quality features are not easily comparable either. See,
e.g., Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 135, at 512, 530 (describing an inability to compare R
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internet is a much less useful a tool for comparing the second-order,
legal aspects of given products.  Indeed, class action waivers—which
seem to clearly frustrate consumers’ welfare—proliferate, without any
meaningful response on the part of consumers.142
A second set of arguments concerns the uncertain power of com-
petition to rectify informational disparities.  If consumers cannot
become informed independently, the argument goes, competition
among suppliers can bring processed, accessible information to their
mind. However, markets are a dubious tool to inform consumers,
even when one assumes that consumers are able to easily filter infor-
mation regarding the legal qualities of standard-form contracts.143
Not all markets are sufficiently competitive to inform consumers.144
Furthermore, the expectation that competing firms would inform
consumers is unconvincing due to the very point of this Part—using
exculpatory provisions selectively.  To the extent that competition can
prevent traditional oppressive terms,145 it is less likely to eliminate
selectively oppressive terms in which one group of consumers gains at
the expense of another.  To begin with, it is highly difficult to inform
the unaware consumers, who are the losers of selective buy-outs.146
Moreover, the defendant’s competitors have no strong incentives to
inform the unknowing consumers even when educating them costs
hotels’ add-on pricing schedules, and the difficulty to “compel banks to make finan-
cial service fees salient”).
142 See generally Gilles, supra note 95 (discussing the increase of use of such waiv- R
ers); see also Robin Sidel, No Day in Court for Bank Clients, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2011, at
C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240531119042925045764826
03037174400.html (describing how U.S. banks are adding contractual provisions
requiring customer complaints to be resolved through individual arbitration); Resnik,
supra note 34, at 122, 128 (“[M]ost of the 240 million mobile telephone subscribers in R
the United States have service agreements that expressly provide for arbitration and
specify that the arbitration must proceed on an individual basis.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
143 As explained before, consumers are unlikely to easily process this information.
See supra notes 133–142 and accompanying text. R
144 See Campbell et al., supra note 32, at *7–11. R
145 Cf. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Con-
tracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 467–74
(2008) (finding no statistically significant correlation between competition and biased
contracts).
146 See supra Part III.B.2.c. for the examples in which vigilant consumers are
excluded to the detriment of unaware consumers. Cf. Gilo & Porat, supra note 107, at R
175 (rival suppliers would find it difficult to educate consumers, as the “uninformed
consumers are often those who are not willing to expend the transaction costs needed
in order to read the fine print in their contracts.”); Campbell et al., supra note 32, at R
*23–25 (arguing that the sophisticated are better off at the expense of non-educated
consumers).
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nothing.  Should competitors do so, the uninformed may well stick to
the same supplier, using the information competitors provided to
require better terms.147  As one commentator observes, “when a flaw is
pervasive in the industry, each seller must choose between correcting
the flaw and educating consumers, or just going with the flow.  It is
not at all clear that the . . . correction strategy will always prevail.”148
Markets, therefore, do not generally correct for selective, pre-
damages buy-outs.  Markets may have, in principle, the capacity to
inform consumers.  But at this point they do not seem to do so with
regard to the subtle, second-order legal attributes of standard-form
contracts.149
The two manifestations of the malleability phenomenon this Arti-
cle discusses—individualizing the prospective class and striking selec-
tive contracts—yield lower threats of litigation and therefore




As previous sections demonstrated, collective litigation is vulnera-
ble to the defendant’s ex ante choice of action.  Collective litigation is
malleable because the doctrinal requirements for class certification
are not independent of the defendant’s behavior; and due to the
structure of the class—weak plaintiffs often depend on strong ones to
147 For a formal exposition of this argument, see Gabaix & Laibson, supra note
135.  In a nutshell, Gabaix and Laibson find an equilibrium in which no firm would R
compete for the uninformed consumers (“Debiasing a consumer is good for the con-
sumer and bad for both firms . . . . Often nobody has an incentive to show [unin-
formed consumers] the error of their ways.”). Id. at 509.  The results hold even where
costs of informing consumers are zero, and thus explain “why industries with nearly
costless marginal information dissemination still shroud [exploiting terms].” Id. at
510.  When informing consumers is not costless, and the market is less competitive,
the results are stronger; the results are weaker when an independent third party edu-
cates consumers. Id. at 527.  For a non-formal discussion, coupled with additional
reasons for competitors not to inform the unaware consumers, see Gilo & Porat, supra
note 107, at 167–74. See also Campbell et al., supra note 32, at *11 (“[I]t [is not] R
profitable for firms to educate naı¨ve consumers, because educated consumers
become sophisticated and then demand fewer high-cost financial services.”).
148 Bar-Gill, supra note 133, at 751.  Oppressive practices can persist in a given R
industry for several other reasons. See Becher, supra note 110, at 742–43 (surveying R
the argument that empirically, at least in certain industries, standard-form terms tend
to be similar across competitors); Patterson, supra note 137 (discussing the phenome- R
non of standardizing standard-form contracts and its repercussions).
149 See the text accompanying supra note 142. R
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redeem their rights, and defendants can buy out strong plaintiffs.
Since collective procedures are mechanisms that help plaintiffs to
overcome litigation inequalities and successfully pursue their claims,
ineffective procedures result in lower overall liability and compensa-
tion.  As litigation serves public goals—most notably, deterring harm-
ful behavior—the defendant’s pre-damages behavior that this Article
describes is a social problem.
Defendants’ pre-damages actions that weaken future enforce-
ment are, then, a type of externality, inflicted on the group of pro-
spective plaintiffs.  This is true regardless of the defendant’s motive.
Independent of its purpose, the defendant made the plaintiffs’ future
case worse by choosing an individualizing course of action or by
employing selective pre-damages disclaimers.  Similar to other exter-
nalizing activities, a general solution is imposing on defendants the
price of their behavior.  Such a price would compel defendants to
internalize the consequences of their conduct, and to engage in the
hazardous activity only up to the socially optimal point.  In this con-
text the defendant’s harmful activity makes prospective litigation less
effective; hence, the price on this externality can be referred to as
litigatory damages.
While the idea of compensable litigatory damages may sound
extreme at first, it is not dissimilar from conventional solutions to
other types of externalizing behavior.  A close analog is evidentiary
damages—deliberately or not, a defendant that lost an important
piece of evidence reduced the value of the plaintiff’s case.150  Making
the plaintiffs’ case worth less by taking a slightly different course of
action is conceptually similar to spoliating evidence.  In both, it makes
sense to discourage the defendant from so doing.151
The price that should be imposed to rectify the defendant’s ten-
dency to overly engage in harmful activities is equal to the social costs
of these activities.  In the current context, the litigatory damages
should match the savings that the defendant reaped from the business
conduct that prevented effective collective litigation.  These sums can
be in principle assessed.  To illustrate, it is the difference between
what the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart would have gained through a hypothet-
ical, “counterfactual” class action; and the amount the group of plain-
tiffs actually receives in the alternative avenue, given the inability to
150 See Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage
Actionable, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1894–95 (1997).
151 The idea of compensable litigatory damages can be extended to deter other
behaviors that affect optimal litigation—one example may be strategic forum-
shopping.
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certify class litigation.  Levying these litigatory damages guarantees
that the defendant will not use pre-damages manipulations unless
they carry a sufficient commercial value, which exceeds their social
harm (in terms of debilitated enforcement).  Furthermore, the sug-
gested calculation of litigatory damages reflects the fact that, in some
cases, individual litigation is effective and hence collective litigation is
a superfluous means to achieve deterrence—in these circumstances,
the litigatory damages would be trivial.
This litigatory damages response is analytically sound.  It restores
optimal deterrence152 and reduces the defendant’s incentives to break
the class to the socially optimal level.  Furthermore, an independent
assessment of litigatory damages achieves these goals without the need
to directly adjudicate split, individualized classes.
While this approach can achieve in theory a first-best, compre-
hensive solution, it substantially deviates from existing practices.153
The remainder of this Part therefore turns to two additional direc-
tions for potential response.  These additional suggestions are imper-
fect, second-best solutions; some better fit some situations, and others
work well under different circumstances.  Nonetheless, they seem to
be more easily implemented than imposing litigatory damages.  The
goal, then, is to provide a menu of nuanced responses that have the
potential to improve upon existing procedures.
The first direction that will be discussed is a case-by-case
approach, which stresses judicial discretion not to honor ex ante
manipulations.  The second direction calls for broader, class-wide
solutions.
B. Judicial Discretion
1. Certifying Individualized Classes
This line of responses calls for judicial attention to attempts to
circumvent, before damages, collective litigation.  In the context of
doctrine-based malleability, where defendants “individualize” the class
in order to avoid certification, judges should ignore these attempts
152 Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 832 (suggesting mandatory class action as a R
means to achieve optimal deterrence).
153 A practical vehicle to materialize this solution, at least in certain circumstances,
may be an appropriate award of punitive damages, which should be determined
according to the monies the defendant saved.  While this approach is consistent with
common law and economics views, which see punitive damages as a remedy for weak
enforcement, judges often hesitate to take this direction. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On
the Proper Magnitude of Punitive Damages: Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 120
HARV. L. REV. 1223, 1225 (2007).
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and decide whether to authorize class action as if no ex ante manipula-
tions took place.  It may be difficult for judges to identify the cases in
which defendants individualize the class to avoid litigation, as opposed
to taking a legitimate business action.  One mechanism that can help
to better sort the two groups of cases is burden-shifting.154  Defend-
ants would be required to explain to the court the independent com-
mercial value of their individualizing choice of action.  Absent
showing a legitimate business purpose for their conduct, defendants
would be barred from arguing that the class is too individualized to
certify.155  To see how this method can eliminate at least some
attempts to avoid collective litigation, consider the following example,
based on an actual case:156
A corporation decided to appropriate the rights of its members,
offering them compensation for their taken shares.  The public
notice for this move was deficient.  Indeed, not a single shareholder
claimed compensation.  Later on, the shareholders filed a class
action.  The corporation raised the statute of limitations defense.
The plaintiffs responded with an equitable tolling claim—they
could not reasonably discover their injury on time.  The corpora-
tion then argued that the equitable tolling question is an individual
issue, which frustrates class litigation because it requires individual
inquiries (whether each plaintiff could not reasonably discover the
injury).  As the corporation lacks business reasons for the deficient
notice that created the individual differences, it should be barred
from raising these differences to avoid certification.
The goal of this proposed procedural modification is straightfor-
ward: individualizing behavior with no legitimate business reasons
should not block class certification.  In this example, it is the flawed
drafting and publication of the notice which created the individual
differences that later precluded class certification; this individualizing
behavior, which seems to lack any legitimate business motive, should
not bar class certification.157
154 I am indebted to Shmulik Becher for encouraging me to develop this
direction.
155 The burden-shifting tool is used in other contexts to winnow out litigants’ stra-
tegic behavior. Cf. Thatcher v. Hanover Ins. Grp. Inc., 659 F.3d 1212, 1214 (8th Cir.
2011) (refusing to allow a litigation maneuver because the plaintiffs “set forth no
adequate reason” for doing so).
156 The case, decided at the Israeli Supreme Court against the plaintiffs, is CA
6887/03 Reznik v. Nir Shitufi Agricultural Cooperative [2010].
157 The reader may wonder how courts should adjudicate such individualized clas-
ses.  As will be elaborated below, see infra notes 180–191 and accompanying text, R
courts have several tools at their disposal to handle classes with relatively more indi-
vidual differences.  While these tools do deviate from mainstream practices, this is a
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The proposed approach would not solve all cases.  Wal-Mart, for
example, would probably be able to meet this burden, showing that it
had independent business reasons to decentralize discretion.158  How-
ever, the burden shifting tool can work well in other circumstances.
The individualized statute of limitations case is one example.  Addi-
tional salient examples that are mentioned in this Article are the indi-
vidualizing computer glitch,159 the informed consent case in which
the doctor allegedly disclosed important information orally, but failed
to do so in the written consent form,160 and provisions that allow the
defendant to elect the applicable law.161  Requiring defendants to
explain their individualizing behavior in these types of cases would
avoid strategic individualizing steps.162
2. Suspicion Toward Waivers and the Contemporary Law
In the context of selective pre-damages contracts, where mass
defendants can buy-out strong plaintiffs, judges can similarly take a
more suspicious approach toward liability waivers.  By restricting the
freedom of the strong would-be plaintiffs, the entire class of victims is
better off.
As before, it seems that some types of waivers—perhaps liability
waivers that are hidden in standard-form contracts163—are hard to
explain on commercial grounds.  These situations are more likely to
reflect attempts to dilute liability through ex ante agreements; hence,
courts should hesitate to honor such waivers.  Likewise, some selective
reasonable price to pay where the defendant has no legitimate reason to take an indi-
vidualizing course of action.
158 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
159 See supra note 73. R
160 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. R
161 See supra note 77.  One can also think of extending the burden-shifting logic to R
mandatory individual arbitration provisions.  In this case, the defendant would be
required to explain the commercial justifications for these clauses. Cf. Szetela v. Dis-
cover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal. App. 2002) (invalidating mandatory indi-
vidual arbitration provision); id. (“[The] provision is clearly meant to prevent
customers . . . from seeking redress for relatively small amounts of money . . . . [The
defendant] has . . . sought to create for itself virtual immunity from class or represen-
tative actions despite their potential merit.”).
162 While the current proposal shifts the burden to defendants to provide a legiti-
mate business purpose, a milder version is asking defendants to show that the individ-
ualizing behavior is part of a reasonable business administration.  In the computer
glitch example, see supra note 73, for instance, the defendant may be able to show R
that the error was reasonable, though it was not motivated by a legitimate business
purpose. Cf. Porat & Stein, supra note 150, at 1940–41 (noting the analytical prefer- R
ence for strict liability, as opposed to negligence, in analog situations).
163 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. R
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waivers are especially harmful, as they exclude prospective plaintiffs
who are crucial to successful litigation.  This might happen where
there is one (or a few) salient strong class member,164 or where the
remaining group is exceedingly weak or unaware of its rights.165
Alternatively, the matter may be too complicated for the remaining
plaintiffs to pursue without the stronger, trailblazing class mem-
bers.166  Technically, judges can invalidate harmful liability waivers
through the doctrine of unconscionability.167  This direction, how-
ever, is not taken by current doctrine.
Contemporary law of disclaimers focuses solely on factors internal
to the adjudication between the parties—complete information, equal
bargaining power, and substantive fairness.168  Similarly, mainstream
law and economics scholarship encourages disclaimers, as they can
more closely fit each consumer’s individual preferences.169  Practi-
164 The nuisance example—in which the strongest prospective plaintiff was the
immediate neighbor of the defendant—demonstrates this situation. See supra notes
114–119 and accompanying text. R
165 Cf. supra notes 124–130 and accompanying text. R
166 This might be relevant where the subject matter is exceptionally complex, or
where courts, for whatever reason, do not certify class actions.  In this state of affairs,
litigation becomes more difficult, stressing the advantages that the defendant has and
the weak plaintiffs’ dependence on strong ones.
167 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (invalidating
mandatory arbitration/class-action waiver provisions on unconscionability grounds);
id. at 1110 (“[Under certain circumstances, a] waiver becomes in practice the exemp-
tion of the [defendant] from responsibility for its [liability].” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).  But, see supra note 95 and accompanying text for the contradictory R
Supreme Court ruling on this specific point.  Another blunt tool to cope with provi-
sions that harm third parties is voiding them on public policy grounds. See  Note, A
Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1445,
1445–46 (2006) (“[N]egative externalities [are] the key factor that may justify voiding
certain contracts on public policy grounds.”).
168 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2–302 (2010).  The Official Comment holds that the relevant
inquiry as to unconscionability is “whether . . . the clauses involved are so one-sided as
to be unconscionable.”  U.C.C. § 2–302, cmt. 1 (2010); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981) (“[G]ross inequality of bargaining power,
together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm indica-
tions that the transaction involved elements of deception or compulsion, or may show
that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact
assent . . . .”); Becher, supra note 110, at 725; Gilo & Porat, supra note 107, at 137 R
(“The question of whether to strike down . . . a clause is generally determined by
courts according to a combination of three considerations . . . : first, the information
gap between the supplier and his consumers . . . ; second, whether the supplier enjoys
superior bargaining power; third, the degree of harshness, or onesidedness, of the
clause.”); Korobkin, supra note 111, at 1256. R
169 See, for example, Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoreti-
cal Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 358 (1988). But see Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier,
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cally, however, information inequalities often distort the price that
suppliers charge for liability disclaimers, generating unfair and under-
compensatory contracts.170  But when there is an express and fair
waiver, there will be no conceptual reason not to enforce it, even if
the defendant pursues a negligent act.171  Aware of these practical dif-
ficulties, law and economics literature came up with creative solutions
to the information problems that are associated with disclaiming lia-
bility.172  And in the internet era information disparities have been
waning.173
The limited view that focuses on internal characteristics tends to
honor, then, waivers between manufacturers and the “commercial, . . .
sophisticated and knowledgeable” buyer.174  This Article calls for
courts to take into account external factors, i.e., how the exclusion
affects fellow consumers/plaintiffs.  Substantive fairness, symmetric
information, and bargaining inequalities are irrelevant to the external
inquiry.  In fact, when the ex ante perspective of this Article is taken,
the traditional results can flip.  Repeat players, commercial parties,
and sophisticated and knowledgeable buyers seem more likely to have
larger and better cases.  Excluding them is the most harmful for the
remaining, weak consumers/plaintiffs.  When a disclaimer provision
in a standard-form contract is inspected, then, judges should have in
mind class members who are not governed by it, in addition to those
Should Consumers Be Permitted to Waive Products Liability? Product Safety, Private Contracts,
and Adverse Selection, *2 (Harv. L. & Econ. Discussion Paper, Paper No. 680, Va. L. &
Econ. Research Paper, Paper No. 2010-11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680932 (arguing that, where consumers have private infor-
mation regarding their probability of being harmed, liability waivers may lead to sub-
optimal safety); Ehud Guttel & Shmuel Leshem, Buying the Right to Harm: The Econom-
ics of Buyouts *10–28 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1930729 (finding that buy-outs enable injurers to manipulate the cost-
benefit standard and avoid liability).
170 See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 227–30 (2006); Mark
Geistfeld, Imperfect Information, The Pricing Mechanism, and Products Liability, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1057, 1066 (1988).  For similar problems in the context of medical malprac-
tice, see Jennifer Arlen, Private Contractual Alternatives to Malpractice Liability, in MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 245, 263–64 (William M. Sage &
Rogan Kersh eds., 2006).
171 See, e.g., GEISTFELD, supra note 170, at 227–30. R
172 See Geistfeld, supra note 170, at 1063 (suggesting that each product would be R
double priced—with and without sellers’ liability); Schwartz, supra note 169, at R
407–08 (same).
173 See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text. R
174 Mark Geistfeld, Products Liability, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 347,
375 (Bouckaert & De Geest eds., 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/table
bib.html (describing the law of disclaimers).
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who end up in court and challenge it.175  The crucial question judges
should ask is the following: how would the class of plaintiffs fare if
there were no liability waivers?
C. Class-Wide Solutions
While existing practices are deficient, as they let defendants avoid
post-damages collectivization, a case-by-case inquiry is by no means a
panacea.  In the context of doctrine-based malleability, the desire to
avoid certification can manifest itself in subtle ways.  In that case, the
task of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate business
strategies seems daunting.  While burden-shifting may resolve certain
cases, defendants, as the Wal-Mart case demonstrates,176 can often
refer to a business purpose that justifies their individualizing course of
action.177  Similar problems arise in the context of selective buy-outs.
Generally, waivers promote efficiency as they satisfy individual prefer-
ences.  Identifying the harmful waivers might be too complicated a
task for courts to accomplish.  While there are cases in which liability
waivers seem to lack any commercial reason, others do have indepen-
dent business justifications.  Likewise, although rules of thumb can aid
in recognizing the buy-outs that substantially harm remaining plain-
tiffs,178 it may be a formidable task to gauge the effects of waivers on
third parties, not in court.  In light of these difficulties, more radical,
class-wide solutions may be appropriate.  The following paragraphs
suggest class-wide responses to the problems of individualizing behav-
ior and selective contracts.  While these class-wide solutions are more
comprehensive than case-by-case proposals, they are also more oblivi-
ous to individual differences.  Put differently, case-by-case solutions
deviate from mainstream practices to a lesser extent, and only in the
more extreme cases.179  Systematically ignoring individual differences,
175 Cf. Patterson, supra note 137, at 336 (urging courts to look at the more global, R
anti-competitive aspects of standard-form contracts).
176 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. R
177 For discussions in other settings regarding the need to show a legitimate busi-
ness purpose and the difficulties of policing this requirement, compare Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) (holding that, in the context of freeze-out
mergers, no “additional meaningful protection is afforded minority shareholders by
the business purpose requirement”), with Coggins v. New Eng. Patriots Football Club,
Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1118 (Mass. 1986) (finding the business purpose test to be a
useful means under Massachusetts statutes for examining freeze-out mergers).
178 For a short summary of relevant rules of thumb, see supra notes 163–166 and R
accompanying text.  In general, selective waivers that target a conspicuously strong
group of plaintiffs, where the remaining ones are particularly weak, are the most
problematic.
179 See supra note 157. R
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however, may be justified where the defendants’ behavior weakens
enforcement and case-by-case inquiries cannot help.
1. Individualizing Course of Action
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the defendant’s choice
of business administration, even if justified by some legitimate com-
mercial concerns, looks like a problematic criterion to determine class
certification.  It is particularly troubling where the alternative—indi-
vidual litigation—is a much less effective route for plaintiffs to vindi-
cate their rights.  To overcome this state of affairs and avoid complex
case-by-case determinations, courts can turn to procedures that do not
yield malleable classes, i.e., rules that do not let the choice of business
strategy determine certification.
As previously discussed, the crux of the battle over certification is
the desire to balance procedural rights against the advantages of col-
lective litigation.  Consistent manipulations of certification standards
should shift the balance in the direction of more collective litigation
(at the expense of procedural rights).
Indeed, if one is willing to sacrifice, at least partially, the notion
of precise individual recovery,180 doctrinal hurdles to certification
become illusory, to a large extent.  Courts can determine liability in
the aggregate; when the common fund—the price the defendant
should pay for its wrongdoing—is set up, it can be distributed to
approximate individual entitlements.  This procedure is by no means
unknown to courts.181  It ensures deterrence, as the defendant pays
the full price—or approximately the full price182—of its actions.  Like-
180 In reality, the principle of appropriate individual compensation is often com-
promised, as administrative constraints may well lead to “rough justice”: actual indi-
vidual compensation is not likely to equal the victim’s damages. AM. LAW INST., supra
note 55, § 1.04 cmt. f.  Likewise, there are reasons to believe that people do not assign R
exceedingly high value to their procedural rights. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 248–75 (2002).  See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial
by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571 (2012), for the tension between individual rights and
values of fairness and equality in this context.
181 See, e.g., 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 63, at § 10:5 (“Courts have not R
required absolute precision as to damages and have allowed damages to be proven by
reference to the class as a whole, rather than by reference to each individual class
member.”); see also Resnik, supra note 34, at 152–53. R
182 Class-wide procedures often approximate the defendant’s liability.  While these
approximations yield accurate amounts on average, they would make the defendant
pay in specific cases sums that are unequal to its liability.  There are nonetheless sev-
eral reasons to keep using class-wide mechanisms.  First, relative to defendants’
wealth, deviations from actual liability are typically immaterial and do not implicate
risk-aversion concerns—firms, by and large, care much more about expected liability
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wise, this method also guarantees a roughly accurate individual com-
pensation to the members of the class.  As class-wide mechanisms to
determine liability ignore individual differences, they obviate the too-
individual hurdle to class certification.  That the defendants can stifle
the certification of future classes should shift courts in the direction of
these class-wide procedures, individual differences notwithstanding.
There are many practical mechanisms to achieve class-wide out-
comes.  To overcome choice of law problems, for example, courts can
roughly divide the class to sub-classes, or, even better,183 employ some
kind of average law.184  Alternatively, judges can be more receptive to
the claim that a single law governs the area.185  To cope with overly
individual classes courts can use rough sub-classes; more general
mechanisms are bellwether trials or sampling to approximate liability
in the aggregate.186  Alternatively, courts can presume a common
question or frame the relevant issues in a way that is common to the
than the precise damages.  Second, by investing more—e.g., sampling more cases—
courts can greatly improve the accuracy of class-wide determinations.  Third, where
deviations from the average are sufficiently sizeable to trigger firms’ risk-aversion con-
cerns, and the accuracy of class-wide procedures cannot be easily improved, courts
can discount the overall liability by the risk that firms have to bear.  Practically, this
means awarding lower damages to account for firms’ risk-aversion.  Finally, and per-
haps most importantly, imprecise procedures should be judged against the alterna-
tive.  Without collective litigation systematic underpayment is the likely result; class-
wide procedures yield, on average, unbiased liability.
183 Sub-classes make the collective action less worthy of pursuing, and hence
reduce the price tortfeasors pay for their wrongdoing. Cf. supra note 46. R
184 See supra note 76 for McCloud and Rosenberg’s proposal.  In the same spirit, R
an unsuccessful proposed amendment to the Class Action Fairness Act suggested that
“the district court shall not deny class certification . . . on the ground that the law of
more than 1 state will be applied.”  151 CONG. REC. S1215 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005).
185 One option is finding a single state law that governs the action. See, e.g.,
Ysbrand v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 625 (Okla. 2003) (applying law of the
defendant’s principal place of business to nationwide class action).  Another alterna-
tive is invoking, where possible, federal law. See, e.g., Ledingham, supra note 83, at R
291 (demonstrating that in the context of mass fraud, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “provides . . . a common federal standard under
which a national class can unite”).
186 For bellwether trials and sampling, respectively, see Robert G. Bone, Statistical
Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561,
563–66 (1993); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577
(2008). Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY. L. REV.
1, 30 (2009) (“[C]ourts seem unwilling to randomly sample from a plaintiff class to
resolve similar issues for all plaintiffs . . . . [However] . . . courts are open to early
scheduling of randomly selected bellwether trials with the expectation that similar
cases will thereafter settle accordingly.”).
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entire class.187  Perhaps the most simple, practical, and effective mech-
anism to find liability in the aggregate is letting the parties settle—
odds are that a certified class would settle, regardless of individual
differences that the defendant raised to oppose certification.188  To
achieve a roughly precise allocation of the common fund, one can use
some form of compensation grids, as often happens in class action
settlements.189
Courts have been employing these class-wide procedures.190  One
notable example of an area in which this approach is common is
securities law.  The area is federalized, hence choice-of-law difficulties
are irrelevant.  In addition, a judicially created legal presumption—
the fraud-on-the-market doctrine—disregards the common-law
requirement of individual reliance, obviating individual differences
that inhibit class certification.191
187 In Wal-Mart, for example, the plaintiffs attempted to attribute a policy of
“excessive subjectivity” to the defendant—a question that is common to the entire
class. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011)
(“[R]espondents claim that the discrimination to which they have been subjected is
common to all Wal–Mart’s female employees.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 10,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277), available at http:/
/www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-277.pdf; see also
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988) (“If an employer’s
undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely the same effects as a
system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination, it is difficult to see why
Title VII’s proscription against discriminatory actions should not apply.”).
For another example, the fraud-on-the-market presumption, see infra note 191 R
and accompanying text.  Of course, there are limitations on the ability to frame the
relevant issues as common questions. Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 83, at 1648–52.  Fur- R
thermore, the framing of the relevant issues as common questions should presumably
alter the calculation of the damages.
188 Courts have a myriad of ways to encourage settlements. See, e.g., PETER H.
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 143–67 (1987) (describing how Judge Weinstein
encouraged the parties to settle).
189 For compensation grids see, for example, David Rosenberg, The Causal Connec-
tion in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849,
917–19 (1984).  Mechanical compensation schemes are very common in class settle-
ments. Cf. the examples in TIDMARSH, supra note 35.  In addition to compensation R
tables, one can think of more radical methods to distribute the common fund.  One
such method, which is useful where the individual stakes are low, is holding a lottery
among the members of the class. See Shay Lavie, Reverse Sampling: Holding Lotteries to
Allocate the Proceeds of Small-Claims Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065 (2011).
190 See, e.g., supra note 181. R
191 As Richard Nagareda explains:
The fraud-on-the-market doctrine has considerable consequences for class
certification. . . . When the fraud is embedded in the market price, in other
words, all those who traded during the relevant period can be said to have
relied upon the fraud—hence, the notion of fraud “on the market” as a
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While the conventional view is to take certification standards as
independent of the defendant’s behavior, previous sections demon-
strated that class certification cannot be determined, according to
existing doctrine, based on a given, objective standard.  Defendants
can reduce the odds of certification by choosing a slightly different,
but still harmful, business strategy.  Because denying certification is
often akin to a death knell to any individual litigation, reducing the
likelihood of certification means substantially lower liability.  This
phenomenon weakens the power of litigation to deter wrongdoing,
and hence, it is a social problem.
When a doctrine ceases to meet its purpose, it should be recon-
sidered.  As this section explains, there are numerous mechanisms
that overcome individual differences and obviate the problem of class
actions’ malleability.  While these methods deviate from mainstream
practices, the balance should tilt toward using them where defendants
can individualize the class—i.e., where they can affect, ex ante, the
cohesiveness of the class.  Courts should be particularly more inclined
to overcome challenges to certification where the alternative avenue
for redress—individual litigation—yields substantially lower proceeds.
A notable example is low-value claims, which are often not worth pur-
suing individually.
2. Selective Pre-Damages Contracts
A shift toward post-damages, class-wide collectivization mecha-
nisms may solve doctrine-based malleability, but it cannot eliminate
the deeper issue of pre-damages selective contracts—the defendant
can buy out strong plaintiffs regardless of the flexibility of the stan-
dards for certification.  To avoid pre-damages buy-outs, one needs
more comprehensive modes of collectivization.  The following are
three directions for such procedures, which take into account the
availability of ex ante agreements.  Although these mechanisms deviate
from current practices, they do point at the direction in which possi-
ble policy reforms can enter where selective pre-damages contracts
pose a problem.
whole.  Like other presumptions in law, this presumption of reliance
remains rebuttable, but its procedural consequence is well-nigh uniform.
The fraud-on-the-market doctrine, in effect, sweeps away opposition to class
certification when that opposition rests upon the concern that the reliance
element presents individualized questions unsuitable for aggregate
treatment.
Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
97, 116 (2009).
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First, one can think of a wholesale ban on liability waivers.  While
this might be a viable option in some areas, in others it is impractical
or inefficient.  To illustrate such a ban, consider securities litigation,
an area in which the law prohibits, in principle, liability waivers.192
This anti-waiver policy is usually explained by the desire to protect
ignorant and weak investors.193  The ban persists although the tradi-
tional reasons seem irrelevant to modern securities markets, in which
information gaps and bargaining inequalities are considered less
problematic.194  In light of markets’ efficacy, the sweeping anti-waiver
policy is by no means self-evident.195  In particular, the anti-waiver rule
masks the variance among investors.  Indeed, several law and econom-
ics scholars criticize the mandatory nature of federal securities regula-
tion.196  Can the ex ante perspective of this Article explain the puzzling
prohibition on waivers?  One can conceive of selective waivers in the
securities context, which aim at excluding the strongest actors (e.g.,
192 The relevant provisions are § 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 and § 29(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The latter, for instance, provides that: “Any
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder . . . shall be void.”  Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 43-291 § 29(a), 48 Stat. 881, 903 (1934); see also
LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULATION 611–25 (5th
ed. 2003).
193 See Arnold S. Jacobs, Affirmative Defenses to Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5
Actions, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 886–93 (1976); Comment, Section 29(a) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act: A “Legislative Chaperon” for Rule 10b-5, 63 NW. U. L. REV. 499, 499–500
(1968); see also Edwin D. Eshmoili, Note, Big Boy Letters: Trading on Inside Information,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 133, 144 (2008) (referring to several sources for the proposition
that the purpose of the anti-waiver policy is to protect “those who cannot protect
themselves” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
194 “Securities often are traded in fairly well-functioning markets, so that the
premises of economic analysis are satisfied more easily . . .”  Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 613
(1985); see also Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L. J. 2359, 2366 (1998) (“[I]nstitutional investors . . . comprise
the majority of stock market investors and . . . determine market prices on which
uninformed investors can rely.”).
195 Nineteenth-century English courts honored contractual waivers in securities
transactions, and American states’ securities laws were not decisive on this point prior
to the federalization of the area. See Comment, supra note 193, at 500–03. R
196 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1309, 1133 (2008) (“A more sensible approach is one that . . . makes it easier
for sophisticated professionals both to opt out of disclosure obligations and opt into
them.” (citing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 269–70 (1991))); Romano, supra note 194, at 2367, 2368, R
2378, 2396; Daniel Sullivan, Note, Big Boys and Chinese Walls, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 533,
564 (2008).
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institutional investors197).  Is the anti-waiver policy appropriate, in
light of the considerations raised in this Article, and given the current
allegedly efficient markets?
These questions exceed the scope of this Article.198  However, the
discussion on securities law does demonstrate an alternative solution
to the problem of selective liability waivers.  Rather than a case-by-case
inquiry as to the validity of each disclaimer, securities law features a
wholesale prohibition.  Such a rigid approach may be useful where
enforcement is deeply flawed; however, it loses on efficiency, as it does
not let individual class members express their divergent
preferences.199
A second direction to account for ex ante buy-outs is aggregating
the interests of all plaintiffs before the occurrence of damages.  Practi-
cally, this means that a third party would represent the class’s inter-
ests.  The third party would not allow liability waivers that hurt the
class, even if such agreements benefit some individual members.
While this procedure is perhaps appropriate in certain enclaves,200 it
seems unrealistic in others.
A third possibility is creating sufficient incentives to litigate as if
there were no pre-damages buy-outs.  Courts can, for example, allow
the attorney who represents the remaining plaintiffs to litigate as if
197 Institutional investors are the perfect candidates for strategic buy-outs.  They
have expertise and sophistication, as well as larger expected damages due to their
sizeable holdings.
198 What might have been appropriate at the enactment of the anti-waiver policy
in the 1930s might be unsuitable today.  Particularly, the advent of effective class liti-
gation improves the enforcement of class-wide obligations. See Nagareda, supra note
191, at 116 (discussing the presumption in favor of class treatment in the securities R
context).  One should judge the anti-waiver policy against these changing
circumstances.
199 Cf. Campbell et al., supra note 32, at *24–26 (discussing standard mortgages R
versus agreements that favor sophisticated consumers).
200 The literature has offered several versions of the idea of third-party, ex ante
representation. See generally Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 135 (proposing third party R
approval of unilateral modifications in standard-form contracts); Shmuel I. Becher, A
“Fair Contracts” Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional
Contract Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 750 (2009) (suggesting a regime of third-
party authorization of form-contracts); Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg,
Unlimited Subrogation: Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to Take
Charge, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (2007) (arguing for assigning all future claims to insur-
ers); Campbell et al., supra note 32, at *20 (“[In the context of negotiating retirement R
plans] employers . . . may mitigate adverse selection by pooling individuals . . . and
they may alleviate problems that arise due to limited cognition or lack of financial
literacy by acting as an agent on behalf of their employees.”); id. at 18 (discussing
third party validation of standard-form contracts).
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there were no ex ante waivers.  Under these conditions, the court
would determine the overall liability.  From this sum, the defendant
would deduct the amount it paid for excluding individual plaintiffs.
The gist is that the counsel’s fee would be based on the total, pre-
deduction liability and damages.  This method should eliminate stra-
tegic motives to strike pre-damages waivers.  While this approach does
have difficulties, they are not insurmountable, at least under some
circumstances.201
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The previous Parts have shown that collective litigation proce-
dures are not objective mechanisms; rather, they are manipulable, vul-
nerable to the defendant’s choice of action.  Mass defendants can
destroy, before the occurrence of damages and in a myriad of ways,
the formation of successful collective litigation.  Specifically, defend-
ants can use doctrinal gaps to individualize the prospective class, mak-
ing it uncertifiable; and can avail themselves of the variance among
plaintiffs to selectively buy out the strongest ones, leaving the remain-
ing plaintiffs in a weaker position.
Elaborating on this malleability phenomenon, the Article shifts
attention to the pre-damages setting.  It is common to say that collec-
tive litigation purports to remedy the deep, inherent inequality
between mass defendants and plaintiffs, the well-known “haves come
out ahead” problem.  As Marc Galanter observed, “authorization of
class action suits . . . [is one of] the most powerful fulcrum[s] for
change.”202  While collective litigation rectifies the ex post “haves come
out ahead” issue, it cannot account for its pre-damages aspects.  As the
Article shows, the “haves” can come out ahead ex ante as well.  This
makes existing collective litigation procedures not as effective as they
are considered to be, allowing the defendants to pay less than the full
price for the harm they inflicted on the group of plaintiffs.  Hence,
this malleability phenomenon is a social problem.203  Accordingly, the
Article offers a menu of responses to obviate attempts to frustrate
effective litigation and to strengthen collective procedures.
In light of the malleability phenomenon one should also give
more serious thought to alternatives and supplements to litigation.
One such alternative is the market.  In some circumstances, market
201 I thank David Rosenberg for raising this point.
202 Galanter, supra note 9, at 150; see also id. at 150–51 (“The intensity of the oppo- R
sition to class action legislation . . . indicates the ‘haves’ own estimation of [its] rela-
tive strategic impact.”).
203 See supra Part I.B.
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forces can effectively deter mass-injurers from selling risky products—
defendants are “motivated by market forces to enhance product safety
because their sales may fall if their products harm consumers.”204  To
the extent market forces discourage wrongdoing better than litigation
does, litigation may become unnecessary.  In that case, the ineffective-
ness of current collective litigation procedures that this Article dem-
onstrates further weakens the case for litigation as a means to achieve
deterrence.  Along the same lines, appropriate responses may be
interventions that facilitate the workings of the market.  In the context
of the malleability phenomenon, such interventions should enable
potential victims, for instance, to easily acquire information regarding
the legal attributes of the product or the service.205
Whether the market actually disciplines mass injurers is an empir-
ical question.  Presumably, there are situations in which the market,
with or without such interventions, cannot help.  One example is nui-
sance-type cases, where the weak, worse-off victims have no contrac-
tual relations with the injurer.206  When both markets and collective
litigation fail to enforce legal standards, regulation is often invoked.207
The capacity of public officials to engage in mass enforcement is lim-
204 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (2010).
205 One suggestion is to encourage the creation of networks of information that
provide, in an accessible manner, data regarding the legal attributes of the product or
the service (e.g., the odds of successful litigation against the prospective defendant
and the existence of hidden selective waivers).  Cf. Becher & Zarsky, supra note 139, at R
360–63 (suggesting governmental platforms that would increase the information flow
from consumers to the broader public).  Another practical suggestion in a related
context may be obligating suppliers to put a clear price on class litigation waivers—
consumers would choose whether to agree to mandatory individual arbitration
clauses for a price discount.  Compare the proposals that each product would be
double priced—with and without sellers’ liability. Supra note 172. R
206 See supra notes 114–119 and accompanying text.  Another example is warran- R
ties that exclude non-buyers. See supra Part III.B.2.b.; cf. Polinsky & Shavell, supra
note 204, at 1490–91 (distinguishing products liability, which involves actual custom- R
ers, from liability to “strangers,” the non-customers, and concluding that with regard
to strangers “market forces do not operate to penalize firms for the harm that they
generate”).
207 Cf. the new wave of regulation of consumer financial products in the aftermath
of the financial crisis (e.g., Michael B. Mierzewski et al., The Dodd-Frank Act Establishes
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection as the Primary Regulator of Consumer Financial
Products and Services, 127 BANKING L. J. 722 (2010)); Alexandra D. Lahav, Can Liz War-
ren Save Class Actions?, MASS TORT LITIGATION BLOG (May 2, 2011), http://lawprofes-
sors.typepad.com/mass_tort_litigation/2011/05/can-liz-warren-save-class-actions-.
html.
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ited.208  However, regulators can help to do exactly what collective liti-
gation is supposed to achieve—flatten the adjudicative inequities
between mass defendants and plaintiffs.  Regulators have the means
and expertise to target areas in which enforcement is unsatisfactory,
e.g., due to the ex ante malleability problem and the collapse of collec-
tive litigation.  Within these areas, regulators are capable of generat-
ing factual and legal information on the defendant’s malfeasance that
litigants need the most.  Private attorneys and market competitors can
follow-up these materials, better disciplining mass wrongdoers.209
This approach, augmenting private enforcement, is not new; it has
been adopted in several areas, most notably securities and antitrust.210
The discussion on supplementing collective litigation procedures
with market forces and regulation exceeds the scope of this Article.
For now, the perspective illuminated in the Article suggests a different
take on the current array of relevant doctrines.  Examples include:
levying on defendants the litigatory damages they inflicted on plain-
tiffs, case-by-case judicial attention, burden shifting to preclude
defendants from raising arguments against certification, a more fre-
quent use of mechanisms to determine liability in the aggregate, and
broader modes of collectivization, which take into account the availa-
bility of pre-damages buy-outs.  These mechanisms can improve, at
least partially, collective litigation processes.  While these suggestions
208 In addition to obvious financial constraints, regulators’ decision making is
often criticized for being captured by industry interests. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow,
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15,
21–24 (2010).
209 As Howard Erichson states:
[A] government lawsuit or investigation may simply give lawyers or litigants
the idea for the private suit, or spur to action those who had been consider-
ing such a suit, and may suggest ideas or language for the complaint.  Gov-
ernment litigation may also generate documentary discovery or other
information that private litigants use in their lawsuits.  The government suit
may result in a judgment with issue preclusive effect against the defendant in
subsequent private litigation.  Successful government litigation may facilitate
private claims by altering public attitudes about the defendants’ liability.
Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mix-
ing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 6 (2000).
210 It was said, for example, that “[t]hirty percent of the class actions settled in
2010 followed the settlement of an SEC action in the same case.”  William W. Bratton
& Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
69, 159 (2011).  For a recent initiative to strengthen enforcement through private/
public cooperation, see Ben Protess, Facing Complaints, S.E.C. Opens Whistle-Blower
Office, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 12, 2011, 10:36 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2011/08/12/facing-complaints-s-e-c-opens-whistle-blower-office/?ref=business.
See also Erichson, supra note 209, at 47. R
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do not resolve all problems, a better understanding of the difficulties
can lead to a better use of the doctrine, and a broader discussion of
the necessity and efficacy of collective litigation.
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